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Abstract
I will argue in this thesis for a prominent position of sophrosyne in the Platonic dialogues
commonly considered early and middle, with the Charmides as a point of departure and as the
spine in themain body of the study andwith theRepublic as themain contender. Imaintain that
the concept of sophrosyne intended at diﬀerent points in the dialogues is more uniform than is
oen assumed. In particular, I focus on the relationship between love, which in its erotic form
(ἔρως) is oen portrayed by Plato, and in popular morality is oen considered, as the opposite
or at least as an opponent of sophrosyne, and self-knowledge, which is at diﬀerent points in the
Platonic corpus associated or identiﬁed with sophrosyne. I contend that each of the deﬁnitions
in theCharmides can be argued to provide signiﬁcant aspects of sophrosyne as portrayed in the
Republic.
iii

Preface
For all quotations from Greek literature I employ the most recent Oxford Classical Text, unless
otherwise noted. For Plato I have decided to stick with the text of Burnet,¹ in spite of the arrival
of a revised volume one. All translations are my own. Greek phrases in the main text are gen-
erally le untransliterated, but ‘sophrosyne’ is treated as if it were an English word throughout.
Abbreviated references to ancient authors and works follow the abbreviations of LSJ.
I spend some time in my introduction on discussing methodological diﬃculties with the
study of the Platonic dialogues. While I end up with a kind of methodological agnosticism,
this will not always be reﬂected in my choice of description of the Platonic works, as repeated
instances of ‘the character Socrates in the work commonly ascribed to the author Plato may be
taken to argue that …’ or ‘one of the so-called Socratic dialogues’ soon becomes tedious. I trust
that the reader will overlook any lack of precision in such cases, unless of course it is deemed
to conceal a hidden premise.
¹ John Burnet (ed.), Platonis opera, 5 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900–07).
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Introduction
Sophrosyne was a strange virtue in ancient times. It remains an elusive concept and is uncon-
troversially one of the most diﬃcult Greek words to translate into a modern language. e se-
mantic and conceptual history of sophrosyne from Homer to Aristotle is a particularly colour-
ful journey, traversing the battleﬁelds of the Persian war, the Peloponnesian war and eventually
casting its shadow over Athenian class struggle as the empire enters its ﬁnal phase, torn between
poets and politicians, mind and body, soul and society. Even as Aristotle has just cut the ex-
cellence down to size, soberly reducing it to one item in a lengthy catalogue of moral virtues, it
suddenly crops up in the acropolis of theNicomachean ethics, conjuring the ghost of its former
greatness, at one stroke saving φρόνησις from itself and revealing the vulnerability of this all
too human virtue as compared with divine σοφία.¹
If φρόνησις retains its divinity with Plato, the cosmological status of sophrosyne is less than
obvious. One is easily misled by the inferior humanity sometimes ascribed to sophrosyne
throughout the dialogues: the ‘human’ and ‘mortal’ sophrosyne of the Phaedrus, the ‘naive’,
‘popular’ and ‘mindless’ sophrosyne of the Phaedo.² And where the content of sophrosyne is to
a large extent straight-forward and constant in Aristotle, Platonic sophrosyne is a complex and
slippery creature, admittedly diﬃcult to deﬁne – as we quickly gather from the Charmides –
and once deﬁned notoriously hard to grasp – as its controversial position vis-à-vis δικαιοσύνη
serves to show in the Republic. In other dialogues the author plays upon the historically am-
biguous word to trick one ormore interlocutors into reluctant acceptance of a conclusion.³ One
is le feeling uncertain whether advantage has been taken of a term with diﬀerent and distinct
¹ Eth. Nic. 1140b7–20. is passage has recently provoked one scholar into claiming Aristotelian ἀκολασία, the
vice corresponding to sophrosyne inAristotle, as a ‘radical ethical vice’ (Kontos, ‘ Ἀκολασία’). ² ἡ παρ’ ἀνθρώπων
γιγνομένη σωφροσύνη (Phdr. 244d4–5), σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη (256b6), σωφροσύνη θνητή (256e5), ἡ εὐήθης
σωφροσύνη (Phd. 68e5), ἡ δημοτικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή … ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ
ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ (82a11–b3). Compare the ‘true’ sophrosyne appearing
at Phdr. 247d6, 250b2 and Phd. 69b2, c1. ³ Grg. 507a1 ﬀ., cf. Dodds, Gorgias, 336; Prt. 332a4 ﬀ. A similar
ambiguity, admittedly not in an ‘elenchtic’ context, may be detected at Smp. 219d3–7.
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senses,⁴ or if the concept in question is one and complex. Is there one virtue or several which
go by the name of ‘sophrosyne’?⁵
is thesis will explore the concept of sophrosyne in the Platonic dialogues, with a particular
emphasis upon the Charmides and the Republic, wherein our concept receives the most undi-
vided attention. e ‘late works’ – Timaeus, Critias, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, Laws – will to
a large extent be excluded from the investigation, due to a demand for limitation. (It would
be a shame to overreach oneself in a study of sophrosyne …) In particular, I will attempt to
bring together the discourse on sophrosyne in the Charmides and the attention it receives in
the Republic.
ere are several approaches available for such an investigation, and the last ﬁy years have
seen the launch of two major studies of sophrosyne, Helen North’s Sophrosyne: self-knowledge
and self-restraint in Greek literature and Adriaan Rademaker’s ‘Sôphrosynê: polysemy, proto-
typicality & persuasive use of an ancient Greek value term’, the former tracing the concept from
Homer up until the church Fathers, the latter concentrating on the literature from Homer to
Plato. It would not be terribly oﬀ the mark to claim that North’s book belongs to the history of
ideas,⁶ while Rademaker employs a linguistic approach in his dissertation, although his aim is
to establish a ‘synchronic semantic description of the uses’ of the word and its cognates before
going on to locate the diﬀerent uses in theCorpus Platonicum.⁷ While I naturally will rely heav-
ily on the results of both North and Rademaker, especially for information about the concept
in writers other than Plato, my own approach will be more philosophically oriented. By this
I mean that my interest in ‘ordinary language’ will be secondary; my aim is to investigate the
philosophical concept or concepts of sophrosyne qua philosophical, i.e. as borne out by the
philosophical thought which surrounds it and which resides in the text, and with a view to the
⁴ Cf. Rademaker, ‘Sôphrosynê’, 1: ‘In Gorgias, it would seem that Plato exploits the polysemy of the term for
persuasive eﬀect. Callicles unsurprisingly rejects σωφροσύνη in one of its typical uses, but Socrates forces him
to accept it in another. Because the dialogue invokes these diﬀerent uses of the term without in any way calling
attention to the fact that they are indeed diﬀerent uses, it then seems that Callicles is caught in contradiction.’
It is not obvious that ‘diﬀerent uses of the term’ is the appropriate way to describe the procedure of the Gorgias.
e whole point of Socrates’ argument is that sophrosyne is necessarily the virtue corresponding to both of the
vices ἀφροσύνη and ἀκολασία. For a discussion of Rademaker’s approach, see Methodological reﬂections below.
⁵ Or, if one wishes to pursue the matter philosophically: What is Plato’s position on this question, and is his
position true? Perhaps even: What account of sophrosyne is discernable in the works commonly ascribed to
Plato, if there is such an account? And even more fundamentally: What would it mean for such an account to
be ‘true’? See below for methodological discussions. ⁶ ‘My aim throughout has been to identify all the nuances
of sophrosyne as they occur, to trace their development, and to suggest, where evidence is available, the reasons
for such changes as seem explicable in the light of altered political, social, religious, or economic conditions, or
the special interests of a given author.’ (North, Sophrosyne, p. viii) ⁷ ‘is study aims to address two related
topics. First, it aims to give a synchronic semantic description of the uses of σώφρων, σωφροσύνη, σωφρονεῖν and
cognates in non-philosophical classical Greek up to the time of Plato, that is to say in the ﬁrst half of the fourth
century BC. Second, it investigates Plato’s use of these terms from the viewpoint of ordinary, non-philosophical
language usage.’ (Rademaker, ‘Sôphrosunê’, 1)
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truth of this concept and its philosophical import.⁸ I will also contend that this approach is
presupposed by North and Rademaker when they study sophrosyne in Plato.⁹ Plato’s ‘diﬀerent
uses’ of word and concept entail an understanding of the thought and philosophical context
within which they come to be used, and unless one considers Platonic thought as obvious to all
and not in need of interpretation, one’s interpretative understanding of the philosophical con-
text withinwhich sophrosyne shows up needs to be foregrounded in an investigation of usage.¹⁰
is is not of course to deny that (that evasive concept) ‘ordinary language’ is of fundamental
signiﬁcance, insofar as as philosophical writing at the very least springs out of ordinary lan-
guage.¹¹
Sophrosyne and related concepts
North notes that with regard to Plato ‘it is diﬃcult to separate the theme of sophrosyne from
the multitude of other subjects with which it is intervowen’.¹² All these subjects are relevant to
a complete philosophical assessment of Platonic sophrosyne. In this study I will concentrate
upon three notions which I consider to be of particular relevance, and which will serve to focus
the investigation; they are love, self and knowledge.
e choice of these three ideas is not arbitrary. Firstly, ‘control of one’s desires’ was the
central connotation of ‘sophrosyne’ in ordinary Athenian language use by the time of Plato,¹³
⁸ By ‘truth’ I do not assume that sophrosyne can be assessed ‘ahistorically’, there may be such a thing as histori-
cal truth. As always when one ventures to engage in a philosophical investigation, the concept of truth becomes
vulnerable. ⁹ North acknowledges that ‘the dramatic structure of each dialogue and the character of the inter-
locutors who are to be refuted or convinced always determine how sophrosyne is to be regarded’ (Sophrosyne,
152). ¹⁰ Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer’s comment on the interpretation of Aristotle: ‘Daß der historisch gesinnte
Philologe mit Notwendigkeit von der philosophischen “Sache”, um die es bei Aristoteles geht, nicht unberührt
blieb, auch wenn er Aristoteles’ Philosophie für genügend tot hielt, um ihn “historisch” zu sehen, wundert uns
heute nicht. Die “Entwicklung” der aristotelischen Philosophie läßt sich nicht ermitteln ohne eine Vorstellung
dessen, was sich da entwickelt. Auch “rein philologisch” gemeinte Kommentare … bezeugen das gleiche.’ (‘Zur
aristotelischen Ethik’, 302) e necessity for such an approach to a similar subject is acknowledged by Gill: ‘We
must read philosophy as philosophy before using it as material for some other kind of enquiry.’ (Personality, 17)
¹¹ NicholasWhite writes: ‘e elucidation of a concept isn’t, to Plato’s way of thinking, simply a way of explaining
or rationalizing ordinary usage. erefore he doesn’t believe that he’s obliged to adhere to ordinary or pre-reﬂec-
tive judgments that that or any other standing usage enshrines.’ (White, ‘Goodness’, 357) is is probably true
to the extent that ordinary usage and ordinary judgment is not allowed the ﬁnal word, but however strange for
instance the deﬁnition of δικαιοσύνη in book IV of the Republicwould seem to the non-academic Athenian of the
day, it purports to be a truer deﬁnition of the same concept, which could not be regarded as a ‘concept’ at all were
it not for a relation to the idea, however corrupt this relation has become in everyday λόγος. In the end, Plato
usually retains the words of ordinary Greek, the ‘meaning’ of which when in use maintains a necessary connec-
tion to at least those aspects of the background or horizon of that meaning which is not explicitly or implicitly
excluded by the particular philosophical context in which they make their appearance. ¹² North, Sophrosyne,
151. ¹³ Rademaker, ‘Sôphrosynê’, 2: ‘… the most central (“prototypical”) interpretation of σωφροσύνη for the
most “central” members of ancient Greek society, adult male citizens.’ Cf. his graphical ‘conspectus’ (195).
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and however the interlocutors in the Platonic dialogues handle the concept, this sense looms
large in the background and must be allowed to inform the reader, if only negatively. ἔρως is
also observed ﬂirting with sophrosyne at several important points in the dialogues, most con-
spicuously in the two speeches of Socrates in the Phaedrus, where both the content of and the
relationship between ἔρως and sophrosyne are ambiguous; also in the speech of Alcibiades in
the Symposium,¹⁴ not to speak of the notorious passage in the Charmides where Socrates is on
the brink of losing himself at the sight of the hidden treasures underneath Charmides’ cloak.¹⁵
While ‘ἔρως’ in ordinary language has strong sexual connotations, one ﬁnds that Plato at times
appears to use it as an alternative term for desire in general – a usage which hearkens back to
Homer¹⁶ – or at least desire for τὰ καλά or τὸ καλόν as such (not merely οἱ καλοί). K. J. Dover
remarks that ‘since Plato’s concept of eros diﬀered from everyone else’s, no evidence relating
to his use of erān and epithūmein tells us anything about Greek usage in general’,¹⁷ and thereby
draws our attention to the fact that Plato does not only widen the usage of ‘ἔρως’ and its cog-
nates – which perhaps could be explained by reference to stylistic reasons –, he developes his
own peculiar concept of ἔρως, and it plays an imporant part in his philosophical thought. I will
quote in full the interpretation of E. R. Dodds, which we shall not assume as correct, but which
will sharpen the direction of our thought:
Eros has a special importance in Plato’s thought as being the onemode of experience which
brings together the two natures of man, the divine self and the tethered beast. For Eros is
frankly rooted in whatman shares with the animals, the physiological impulse of sex (a fact
which is unfortunately obscured by the persistent modern misuse of the term ‘Platonic
love’); yet Eros also supplies the dynamic impulse which drives the soul forward in its
quest of a satisfaction transcending earthly experience. It thus spans the whole compass
of human personality, and makes the one empirical bridge between man as he is and man
as he might be. Plato in fact comes very close here to the Freudian concept of libido and
sublimation. But he never, as it seems to me, fully integrated this line of thought with the
rest of his philosophy; had he done so, the notion of the intellect as a self-suﬃcient entity
independent of the bodymight have been imperilled, and Platowas not going to risk that.¹⁸
If sophrosyne bears an intrinsic relation to ἔρως (and we are in no position to take this for
granted just yet), one will expect that the notion of sophrosyne will be aﬀected by developments
in the notion of ἔρως, and depending on the nature of this supposed relationship, the inﬂuence
might ﬂow both ways.
¹⁴ E.g. Smp. 216d2–7: ὁρᾶτε γὰρ ὅτι Σωκράτης ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν … ἔνδοθεν δὲ ἀνοιχθεὶς πόσης
οἴεσθε γέμει, ὦ ἄνδρες συμπόται, σωφροσύνης; ¹⁵ Chrm. 155c4ﬀ. e similarity between the ‘inside glimpses’
in the Charmides and the Symposium may be signiﬁcant. ¹⁶ Cf. Dover, Greek homosexuality, 43. ¹⁷ Dover,
Greek homosexuality, 43 n. 11. ¹⁸ Dodds, Greeks and the irrational, 218–19. As for the last assertion, to the
extent that Plato locates all desire, rational and irrational, within the soul in such works as the Republic and the
Phaedrus, psychic independence would not seem to be imperilled at all. If anything, ‘physiological impulse’ would
a bit oﬀ the mark as far as Plato is concerned.
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ere is another signiﬁcant point related to this aspect of ἔρως, which brings us to the subject
of knowledge. A wide-spread contention has it that in the ‘Socratic version’ all human desire
is desire for the truly good, and that the decisive ethical factor is the state of knowledge of this
good in each individual. Conversely, the ‘Platonic version’ opens the gates to ‘irrational desires’,
the objects of which are rivals of the good. Christopher Rowe has even made a case for making
this the basis of a developmentalist interpretation of the Platonic dialogues.¹⁹ In the ‘middle
dialogues’, there is a tendency for the erotic object of the philosophical soul, or the philosophical
part of the soul, itself to be identiﬁed as learning, knowledge or wisdom.²⁰ At any rate the
relationship of motivation and rationality to desire and knowledge is not transparent to the
naked eye.²¹ ese circumstances impinge on the investigation of sophrosyne in several ways.
First, there is an ‘intellectual’ aspect to sophrosyne as handed down in the literature, where
the ‘etymological’ connotation ‘soundness of mind’ ﬁgures alongside a notion of ‘prudence’ in
particular,²² and which has been connected also with the Delphic γνῶθι σαυτόν (know thy-
self). is is the aspect awakened in the Protagoras and theGorgiaswhere ἀφροσύνη is thrown
up as the natural antithesis to sophrosyne,²³ and it reaches a climax with the knowledge-of-
knowledge discussion in the Charmides. e latter is oen interpreted as part of the ‘Socratic’
endeavour to show that all virtue is or involves knowledge. But one may wonder whether
not sophrosyne carries a greater claim to association with knowledge than does virtues such
as δικαιοσύνη, ὁσιότης and ἀνδρεία. is leads to the question of the connection between
sophrosyne and φρόνησις/σοφία.²⁴ One should not so easily, I think, dismiss the proposals of
the Charmides as simply rejected once and for all ‘because σωφροσύνη cannot then be mean-
ingfully distinguished from other types of virtue’,²⁵ however aporetic the end of the discussion.
Second, this intellectual aspect of sophrosyne, as I so boldly termed it, is as we have seen but
one aspect (or separate connotation, as it may be). It is the complex nature of sophrosyne, its
vacillation at the interface between character and intellect, which renders it the perfect occasion
for exploring the nature of and relation between knowledge and desire, rational and irrational,
and those elusive concepts: character and intellect. In harmony with this observation is the fact
that the knowledge associated with sophrosyne is seldom encountered in contemplation of the
world outside or the great beyond, its domain is rather the knower himself. What is the nature
of this self-knowledge, how are we to conceive of the ‘self ’ which is both knower and known,
and how does this knowledge relate to other kinds of knowledge, in particular knowledge of
¹⁹ Rowe, ‘Plato, Socrates and developmentalism’ …; ‘Interpreting Plato’, 18 ﬀ. See below for critical assessment of
his approach. ²⁰ e.g. Phd. 68a7, R. 571b … ²¹ Some of the issues are discussed by Rowe in ‘Plato’s “Socratic”
dialogues’, which is a response to Charles Kahn’s Plato and the Socratic dialogue. ²² For an overview, see Rade-
maker, ‘Sôphrosynê’, 178–81. ²³ See n. 3 ²⁴ φρόνησις and σοφία are not strictly separated in Plato, as they
come to be in Aristotle. ²⁵ Rademaker, ‘Sôphrosynê’, 242.
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the good?
e question of the self reappears in a diﬀerent context when Socrates is persuaded to deﬁne
sophrosyne in the Republic. Our virtue ﬁrst incites the very partition of the infamous tripartite
soul, before it ends up as the glue which prevents the brittle structure from breaking apart. It
is deﬁned as συμφωνία (harmony), φιλία (friendship) and ὁμόνοια (unity of mind) between
the diﬀerent elements, and ὁμοδοξία (unity of opinion) as to which is to rule and which to be
ruled. Are these merely euphemisms for subjugation, or are the ‘irrational’ parts truly capable
of the kind of agreement implied by terms such as ὁμόνοια and ὁμοδοξία?
Again, if ‘φιλία’ is not simply a poetic metaphor, one would be entitled to wonder about the
fact that while the deﬁnition of sophrosyne is supposed to be an interpretation of τὸ κρείττους
εἶναι τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν τήν ἐν
τοῖς ἐλάττοσί τε καὶ ἐπιεικεστέροις,²⁶ the deﬁnition itself is wrought in terms closely associated
with ἐπιθυμία.²⁷ Hence, when I mentioned ‘love’ as one of three subjects I will bring to bear
upon the present investigation, this includes both ἔρως and φιλία, their diﬀerences and their
points of connection.
Reflections on method
e study of Plato’s philosophy encounters all the methodological diﬃculties attaching to every
study of any ancientGreek author, and it is not exempt from the particular considerations due to
all engagement with philosophical texts, but it harbours in addition several obstacles of its own.
e three most important are closely related andmay be described as the Socratic problem, the
Platonic question and the problem of the dialogue form.
e ﬁrst concerns our knowledge of the historical Socrates and his relation to the character
Socrates in the dialogues of Plato and the thought displayed in these works. To what extent
is the interlocutor of the dialogues true to the historical person? In particular, how much, if
anything, of the ideas, if any, maintained by the dialogue ﬁgure can be ascribed to the real
Socrates as contrasted with a distinctive Platonic mode of thought? Is it on the whole possible
to make such a distinction and to trace a shi across the dialogues from ‘Socratic’ to ‘Platonic’?
We enter now what I referred to as the Platonic question, the question of how to approach,
grasp and enjoy the thought of Plato. e most striking challenge at ﬁrst glance is of course the
presentation of this thought in the form of dialogues, to which I shall shortly return. An even
more fundamental problem in the eyes of many is the obscurity of the internal relationship of
²⁶ See R. 431c20–d27, relating to sophrosyne of the polis. ²⁷ See R. 581a3, where φιλία appears to be used inter-
changeably with ἐπιθυμία, albeit arguably only to smooth over the use of φιλοχρήματος, φιλοκερδής, φιλότιμος
etc.
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the corpus: Is it at all permissible to draw upon one dialogue while interpreting another? If so,
are they all consistent? If not – and this is the impression of most – how are we to account for
the inconsistencies? Are they deliberate or not? If yes, what are the reasons? If no, what is their
explanation? Are they the result of some intellectual or otherwise psychological deﬁcit? Can
they perhaps be traced to the natural development of an author’s mind throughout a long life
of thought and writing?
At this point we stumble upon the important developmentalist (hypo)thesis, which has en-
joyedwidespread inﬂuence in the Platonic scholarship ofmodern ‘analytic’ or ‘Anglo-American’
philosophy. e standard view revolves around the assumption that Plato’s philosophical doc-
trines developed, that the chronology of composition is possible to establish at least in broad
strokes, and that the portrait of Socrates in the presumed early group of dialogues is to a large
extent faithful to the historical Socrates. In her bookAgora, Academy and the conduct of philos-
ophy Debra Nails collects and arranges the diﬀerent kinds of evidence for establishing a com-
positional chronology, criticising every attempt as she goes along.²⁸ I ﬁnd her criticisms and
her resulting agnosticism convincing.
Perhaps the most impressive singular moment of her survey is the conspectus of a repre-
sentative selection of proposed chronologies, arranged according to the criteria of stylometry,
philology and philosophical content.²⁹ Apart from a comparatively uncontroversial ‘late group’,
consisting of Timaeus, Critias, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus and Laws – ‘comparatively’ because
Holgeresleﬀ considers them to be written and edited by a secretary³⁰ – Nails concludes that
‘the “fact” that the Apology is pre-middle [i.e. either ‘early’ or ‘transitional’] is the one uncon-
troversial statement that can be made about the chronological order of the dialogues’.³¹
She moves on to a detailed critique, which I will not recount, of the attempt by Gregory
Vlastos to establish criteria for distinguishing the truly Socratic Socrates from the Platonic one,
before assessing the work of stylometricians, in particular the work of Gerard Ledger. Ledger
provides the ﬁrst (and at the time the only) stylometric study of the dialogues based on aspects
of style which are guaranteed to be unconscious, and therefore one of exceedingly few to bypass
what Nails terms the ‘invidious circularity that so oen occurs in Platonic stylometric studies’,³²
i.e. the assumption that certain stylistic changes are associated with developing age. Nails also
notes two crucial caveats to reliance on stylometry: (1) If Plato consciously changed his style
²⁸ Nails,Agora, ch. 4–7. ²⁹ Nails,Agora, 62–8. Stylometricians: Campbell, Brandwood and Ledger; philologists:
Lesky andesleﬀ; philosophers: Guthrie, Irwin, Vlastos, Kahn, Kraut and Fine. ³⁰ I note that Nails appears to
assent to esleﬀ ’s picture of the development of the Republic and the ‘late works’ in Nails, ‘Life of Plato’, 6, 11.
³¹ Nails, Agora, 68. ³² Nails, Agora, 99.
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back and forth instead of displaying linear development, stylometry is useless.³³ (2) If his style
changed ‘subtly but not linearly’, stylometry could identify groups of dialogues written at about
the same time, but their chronological relation to other groups would remain obscure.³⁴
Finally, she considers esleﬀ ’s idiosyncratic attack on developmentalism, and one element
of his critical thrust is of particular importance to our study: Comparing a multitude of studies
which on the basis of a single subject have proposed chronological arrangements of a group of
dialogues, it is found that ‘when the same dialogues are examined for the evolution of Plato’s
thought on diﬀerent topics, diﬀerent sequences are derived’.³⁵ Some of these studies could of
course very well hit the mark, but needless to say, one should handle a developmentalist thesis
such as that of Rowe, mentioned above,³⁶ with caution.³⁷
On account of this evidence there seems to be no short-cut to chronological certainty, and the
developmentalist hypothesis may in any case be of little value.³⁸ As for the opposite viewpoint,
that Plato’s thought did not develop, but remained the same, it is (likewise, it would seem)
neither veriﬁable nor falsiﬁable without detailed interpretation of the corpus, and even then
will have to rest its case on informed conviction.³⁹ However, this viewpoint is closely associated
with the alternative explanation of inconcistencies and the like mentioned above: ey are
intentional. CharlesGriswold articulates this belief as a hermeneutical principle, the hypothesis
‘that a text is coherent and possesses a uniﬁedmeaning’, where ‘themain assumption supporting
the hypothesis … is that the author knows precisely what he is doing and so that he means to
write both what and how he does write’.⁴⁰
e companion piece to this approach to the Platonic dialogues is the assumption that what
is said depends on how it is said, that the dialogues should precisely not be read as philosophical
treatises fettered by irrelevant drama, but that the dramatic context needs to be appreciated as
integral to whatever arguments emerge on the journey from prologue to epilogue. Accordingly,
‘Socrates’ is the mouthpiece of neither the historical Socrates nor the historical Plato, he is a
character in a story and must be treated as such; any ‘doctrine’ or ‘meaning’ leans on each
dialogue as a whole, not on isolated propositions at the lips of Socrates or some xenos, as the
³³ e ‘consciously’ is of course not really relevant. As long as there is the possibility that he changed his style
along diﬀerent parameters than age, stylometry remains problematic. Michael Bordt mentions the possibility that
the subject of a dialogue, or the choice of interlocutors, may have aﬀected the style of writing (Bordt, Platon: Lysis,
97). ³⁴ Nails, Agora, 100. ³⁵ Nails, Agora, 129. ³⁶ See p. 5. ³⁷ See also the convincing criticism of the
‘standard chronology’ by Nicholas Denyer the introduction to his commentary on the Alcibiades (Denyer, Plato:
Alcibiades, 20–26). ³⁸ As to its status quo, it is symptomatic that in the introduction to the collection of papers
from a conference of 1999, Julia Annas refers to the ‘rapidly increasing breakdown of the long-accepted paradigm
for interpreting Plato which rests on a broad division of the dialogues into “early” (and “Socratic”), “middle”,
and “late” ’ (‘Introduction’, p. ix.). ³⁹ Which perhaps should not really be considered a limitation; Gadamer
criticises ‘the requirement of certainty that statements or judgments must meet if they are to satisfy the scientiﬁc
consciousness of the modern world’, and argues for an older concept of certainty as the only viable approach to
Plato (‘Reply to Nicholas P. White’, 258ﬀ.). ⁴⁰ Griswold, Self-knowledge, 11.
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case may be. I heartily embrace this principle of interpretation, while recognising that the
phrase ‘the whole dialogue speaks’ has become something of a cliché.⁴¹ Griswold, however,
adds two more guns to his interpretative arsenal, (1) that the single dialogue is the primary
whole, while the Platonic corpus is lacking in suﬃcient organic unity,⁴² and (2) that the dramatic
dates and the ﬁctional chronology both makes possible and places limits on justiﬁable use of
interdialogical reference. I subscribe to the former, but the latter, while interesting, should in
my opinion be treated as less of a guiding principle of interpretation than as a possible result.
While the dramatic date of some dialogues may be important to the interpretation of these
dialogues considered as singular wholes, there are few indications to the eﬀect that the ‘ﬁctive
chronology’ provides any systematic hermeneutical unity to the corpus.⁴³
But alas our subscription to the view that dramatic context is an integral part of the philo-
sophical statement contained in a dialogue does not resolve the question of authorial intention.
Griswold does not really deﬁne his concept of intention, but he excludes ‘causal factors (if any)
that may surround the author’s psyche, the author’s motives, or what was going through his
mind as he wrote’. e text is to be conceived as a coherent articulation of the truth aimed at
its intended readers, and any aporia confronting the interpreter is to be assumed as part of the
author’s design; it is not to be assumed as a mistake. He further lists two studies of the art of
interpretation, the books of Juhl and Hirsch, and refers to the former for a clariﬁcation of the
concept of authorial intention, but claims a closer bond to the overall theory of the latter; ﬁ-
nally he praises the criticisms by Juhl and Hirsch of the hermeneutical writings of Hans-Georg
Gadamer. Juhl’s concept of authorial intention may be explained as what the author ‘utters’
when he writes each particular sentence. Hirsch maintains that the only normative measure
⁴¹ Cf. Ferrari, review of Press. While I share Ferrari’s views on the kind of non-dogmatist New Platonism which
he criticises – amounting to the claim that the dialogues so to speak lack a philosophical object, I believe that the
Gadamerian approach I set out below avoids this attack. ⁴² Griswold, Self-knowledge, 15. ⁴³ In any case, Gris-
wold’s claim that ‘Plato has ordered most of the dialogues in terms of a ﬁctive chronology’ (Griswold, Self-knowl-
edge, 15) is too strong, considering the lack of consensus concerning this order. A telling example is Griswold’s
casual remark that ‘a brief examination of the Symposium will help us establish the signiﬁcance of Phaedrus’ reap-
pearance in the “later” Phaedrus’ (Griswold, Self-knowledge, 16), compared to the tentative order suggested by
Nails (following Dover in dating the Phaedrus): Phaedrus, 416–18 BC; Symposium, 416 BC (Nails, People, 314).
Griswold may have good arguments for his particular order, but it would seem that the hermeneutical relevance
of this chronology begs the question; it must be established by, not guide, interdialogical reference. Wieland
(Wieland, Platon, 89–93), to which Griswold refers for further discussion (Griswold, Self-knowledge, 249 n. 28),
achieves a very interesting interpretation of the import of the Parmenides with the use of ﬁctional chronology,
but his point of departure is the unique position of this dialogue when the extra-ordinary content (criticism of
the Ideas) combines with the exceptional dramatic date (450 BC, Socrates for once portrayed as a young man).
He does not appear to encourage the kind of general principle of interpretation apparently endorsed by Griswold
when he writes that ‘the ﬁctive chronology prevents us from using a (ﬁctively) later dialogue in order to interpret
an earlier one’ (Griswold, Self-knowledge, 16).
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for the meaning of a text is the meaning of the author, including his ‘unconscious’ meaning.⁴⁴
As for their criticism of Gadamer, I disagree with both Hirsch and Juhl, and by implication also
the foregrounding of authorial intention conducted by Griswold.⁴⁵ I will defend Gadamer’s
general theory of interpretation in the following paragraphs.⁴⁶
e main point about Gadamer’s aversion to the doctrine of authorial intention is precisely
that one should read the text as primarily a claim to truth, not as an exposition of the author’s
idiosyncratic state of mind. If it is a claim to truth, it cannot be understood as such unless
the subject matter (die Sache) itself is brought to question by the interpreter. Now, Gadamer
does not believe in the ‘perennial problem’, there is no such thing as a timeless subject matter,
which is not to say that it is up for grabs and a ﬁgment of the imagination, nor that it lacks any
form of identity; rather this identity is preserved by the tradition of questioning, the repeated
προβολή of the πρόβλημα, and by the preservation inherent in language. e subject matter
does not remain wedded to the subjectivity of the individual because the individual is not a self-
⁴⁴ I admit that this exposition of their respective positions is scant to say the least, and necessarily an oversimpli-
ﬁcation which does not do justice to their comprehensive studies. I refer to their books for detailed accounts. My
own defence of the basic tenets of Gadamer’s theory excludes the position of Juhl and Hirsch. ⁴⁵ Juhl’s short and
superﬁcial criticism is misguided because it is directed solely upon Gadamer’s description of the overcoming of
misunderstandings, which he misconstrues. While Gadamer’s description presupposes that the enlightened in-
tepreter is in fact open to the claim of the other / the text, in theway he describes the ‘experienced’ interpreter, Juhl’s
construction of it does not. Hirsch in his thorough critique clearly misconstrues Gadamer’s notion of ‘possibility’
and ‘concretisation’, thus mistaking the ‘meaning of the text’ as ‘a never-exhausted array of possible meanings’ (p.
249) – Gadamer clearly states that the interpretation when successful is not an othermeaning, but the concretisa-
tion of the original meaning, the interpretation is more of a relation to the text than a second product, if the text
is an ἔργον, the interpretation is an ἐνέργεια; his criticism of the lack of objective ways of resolving disagreements
of interpretation at any one time (ibid.) is a product of the same misunderstanding, there is an objective standard,
the text itself, as a more pregnant possibility than that which is assumed by Hirsch; he misconstrues the concept
of tradition as a supposedly ‘stable norm’, ‘a principle for resolving disagreements between contemporary readers’,
while maintaining that it is ‘no more or less than the history of how a text has been interpreted … a changing,
descriptive concept’ (p. 250). But the tradition of a text does not exist without the normativity of the text it-
self, and the Gadamerian concept of tradition is not the history of a text’s interpretation, but the whole of history
within which the text was conceived and transmitted, again tradition is a relation to the text; he misconstrues the
concept of ‘perspective’ as something closed up from the start (p. 254), while the Gadamerian concept of perspec-
tive cannot be disconnected from his concept of prejudice, which, if unbreakable, retains the character of pre-,
i.e. it is a concept of potential openness; he eﬀects a complete misconstrual Heidegger’s concept of temporality
– which he by the way has correctly understood as a major source for understanding Gadamer’s thinking – and
surely misrepresents as well Gadamer’s presentation of this concept when he claims that ‘Heidegger, on Gadamer’s
intepretation, denies that past meanings can be reproduced in the present because the past is ontologically alien
to the present’ (p. 256), and what he calls the ‘radical historicity’ of both; ﬁnally, he advances his own concept
of pre-apprehension as a competitor to the misconstrued concept of Gadamerian prejudice, which fails utterly to
attain the potency of the concept of question, which is essential to the theory of prejudice maintained by Gadamer,
and which is not mentioned with one word by Hirsch; on the whole he construes Gadamer’s dictum ‘understand-
ing –> interpretation’ as if understandig simply is interpretation while interpretation is merely the translation
into the idiom of the day or of the individual. While for Gadamer to say that understanding –> interpretation –>
application is to say that the individual interpreter establishes and remains in an understanding, intepreting and
applicating relation to the text, i.e. partakes in its meaning. ⁴⁶ My account is based on Gadamer,Wahrheit und
Methode, passim, as well as ‘Zwischen Phänomenologie und Dialektik’ and ‘Text und interpretation’.
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contained subject cut oﬀ from the world of objects to which it must gain access; the individual
is essentially worldly and understands itself immer schon in terms of this world of objects on
account of being part of a tradition into which it is thrown. Neither is the tradition something
apart from either the ‘subject’ or the ‘objects’, but the historical world within which both subject
and object ﬁrst appear.
In practical terms, it is reasonable to begin to read a singular Platonic dialogue, and under-
stand each singular ‘statement’ within the whole represented by that dialogue. But the singu-
lar dialogue is no completely self-contained whole as is the impression one may gather from
the Griswoldean approach; rather, it is caught up in its subject matter, and this subject matter
shows itself (φαίνεται) within a historical horizon – the horizon of the text – as a φαινόμενον,
to which are related not least the other works of the author. While the concept of psychological
development on this account is a misguided approach founded on a misunderstanding of the
nature of the ψυχή, this does not exclude the possibility that the ‘letting-be-uncovered’ of the
phenomenon ‘develops’ and that there are both diﬀerences in the relation to the subject matter
to be discerned across the dialogues and that these diﬀerences may throw light upon both of
the dialogues and their phenomenon.⁴⁷ What is to be avoided is the comparison of singular
statements across dialogues as if they existed in a vacuum; the horizons of the phenomenon
must be established (logically) prior to the search for interrelations; it is not the wording which
produces the meaning, but the meaning which recommends the wording. e necessity of ‘ex-
ternal’ evidence is entailed by the concept of language and meaning endorsed by Gadamer,
insofar as one understands the externality as purely formal – embracing what is not explicitly
written in the dialogues; however, this evidence is still part of the text as its essential horizon.
Remarks on structure
We have now determined the object, the sources and the approach of the study. e path which
our investigation must take should follow from these considerations. e concepts of love, self
and knowledge are all connected to sophrosyne, while the latter remains our primary object of
investigation. Hence it makes sense to let sophrosyne determine our path, and to make room
⁴⁷ Interestingly, Gadamer himself appears to recognise a ‘standard chronology’ of the dialogues as a more or less
established fact (e idea of the good, 21, 24), but criticises the ‘naive chronological ordering’ implied in the claim
that ‘Plato came to this theory [the doctrine of the ideas] only later on’; instead he seeks to establish a ‘structural
chronology’ founded on ‘structural similarities among groups of dialogues’ (ibid. 21–2). Starting from certain
knowledge – if it was available – about the actual chronology of compositionwould in any case appear to contradict
Gadamer’s approach to what he calls ‘Plato’s intentions as an author as well as the implicit content of the dialogues’
(ibid.), where ‘intention’ should be understood as the relation to the subject matter, not as the kind of mental state
devalued inWahrheit und Methode.
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for digressions on the subordinate concepts where they crop up. e concept of sophrosyne
receives an exceptional treatment in the Charmides and the Republic. It is exceptional in that
they contain explicit attempts at a complete deﬁnition; the discussions of the Protagoras and the
Gorgias are not thematic to the same extent. Furthermore, the outcome of the attempt in each
of the two dialogues is very diﬀerent. ey will accordingly be the main focus of our study.
e ‘Socratic’ character of the Charmides renders it a proper place to formulate some ques-
tions about the nature of sophrosyne as such, questions which demand to be put from the very
start, but which would lack the proper ground if we were to ask them ourselves before we have
any material on which to apply them. A preliminary survey of the use of ‘sophrosyne’ in the
older literature would supply some material, but this literature as we have it does not itself sys-
tematically ask the question of what kind of thing sophrosyne is. is is precisely the question
introduced by Plato’s Socrates in the Charmides. Since I try to compare and bring together the
accounts of sophrosyne in the Charmides and the Republic, the Charmides will remain the ele-
ment which carries the structure of the investigation. We will proceed systematically through
theCharmides, pausing at each junction to look for similarities and discrepancies in the Repub-
lic.
e Charmidesmay be divided into ﬁve main parts: e prologue and the four main deﬁni-
tions. Our studywill adhere to this division. While interpreting the prologue, I found it prudent
to stop and try to establish a preliminary interpretation of the Platonic concept of ἔρως, which
plays a signiﬁcant role in the prologue, and which remains important throughout. Aer this I
stick more closely with the Charmides, the diﬀerent sections representing the divisions of this
dialogue.
Charmides: the question of sophrosyne
We are used in a philosophical context to think of sophrosyne as a virtue, an ἀρετή. In the ear-
lier literature, the word ἀρετή was primarily connected with a diﬀerent and in many respects
opposite quality of that with which sophosyne was to become associated. ἀρετή was the excel-
lence of the noble-man warrior, a combination of the Aristotelian ἀνδρεία and μεγαλοψυχία
upon the foundation of εὐγένεια, a ἕρμαιον on the battleﬁeld, a close associate of ὕβρις in the
political life of the later Greek city-state. While at times retaining its ancestral connotations in
less rigid parts of the Platonic dialogues, ἀρετή is mostly treated as the quality corresponding to
being ἀγαθόν – another word with a somewhat transformed horizon – as the opposite of κακία.
e only explicit mention of ἀρετή in the Charmides is arguably of this kind, when Socrates ex-
tols the paternal lineage of Charmides by describing it as διαφέρουσα κάλλει τε καὶ ἀρετῇ καὶ
τῇ ἄλλῃ λεγομένῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ‘standing out in beauty and virtue and every other aspect of that
which is called happiness’.⁴⁸
κάλλος τε καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ ἄλλη λεγομένη εὐδαιμονία. Socrates’ casual and slightly sarcastic
remark – the sarcasm emphasised by λεγομένη – harbours in reality an extraordinarily po-
tent trio: (1) εὐδαιμονία, the compressed expression of the completely excellent condition of a
human individual, remarkably suited to emphasise alike external and internal, subjective and
objective; (2) κάλλος, beauty, the paradigmatic expression of immediate excellence, and an ab-
stract noun corresponding to the adjective καλός, which has a wider extension better captured
in the abstract τὸ καλόν;⁴⁹ (3) ἀρετή, the excellence especially associated with functional ex-
cellence, with use.⁵⁰ κάλλος is also in the Charmides the most immediately striking excellence
of the eponymous interlocutor, the handsome and promising μειράκιον⁵¹ Charmides son of
Glaukon, the cousin of Critias son of Callaeschrus.
⁴⁸ Chrm. 157e7–158a1. ⁴⁹ Ferrari’s reference (Ferrari, ‘Platonic love’, 252) to the wide semantic range of κάλλος
ismisleading as far as the noun goes, at least on the level of ordinary usage. Even Plato does not seem able to stretch
its application beyond the realm of the sensible; κάλλος ψυχῆς and κάλλος ἐπιστήμης puts its emphasis on the
striking immediacy of this quality. See also p. 17 below, with n. 78. ⁵⁰ Compare the close connection between
ἀγαθόν and ὠφέλιμον oen presupposed in the dialogues. ⁵¹ Chrm. 154a8 ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ὦν, 154b5 μειράκιον, 154d1
νεανίσκος, 155a4 νεανίας. Neither of these are, of course, as their interchangeability reveals, ﬁxed or precise
designations of age. Nails makes him ‘no more than seventeen’, mainly on account of his still requiring Critias
as ἐπίτροπος (155a6), designating his date of birth as ±446 and following Planeaux (‘Socrates’) in locating the
Charmides in May of 429 (Nails, People, 90–1, 311–12).
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Passionate prologue
Charmides is introduced as an outstanding object of desire, hunted by packs of manic ἐρασταί
about his own age, admired as an ἄγαλμα by even the children and the cause of slap-stick com-
edy among the older ensemble on the bench, in the words of the generally senseless Chaere-
fon: πάγκαλος τὸ εἶδος. Socrates is impressed, in spite of his lack of discrimanatory powers
concerning the beauty of those in their prime, and while initially retaining his self-control to
the extent that he is able to observe the observers as Charmides makes his entrance, he is not
untouched when the boy passes him an irresistible glance,⁵² and ﬁnally loses himself when he
accidentally catches a glimpse of Charmides’ naked body.⁵³ Hemanages however to go through
with his scheme, to determine the condition of Charmides’ soul (εἰ τὴν ψυχήν … τυγχάνει εὖ
πεφυκώς⁵⁴) under the pretence of knowing a cure for headaches.
It is oen remarked that even if the most prominent connotation of sophrosyne in Plato’s
own day – control or restraint of the passions – is absent from the explicit conversation of
the Charmides, it hardly goes unnoticed behind the scenes.⁵⁵ e most prominent passion is
ἔρως, but I would like to make a case as well for the possible hint at the passion for drinking.
βαρύνεσθαί τι τὴν κεφαλὴν ἕωθεν ἀνιστάμενος ‘to have a somewhat heavy head when getting
up in the morning’⁵⁶ reminds one very much of a hangover, so that there might be one more
layer of irony to Socrates’ story of racian medicine (see below), as well as one more conno-
tation of sophrosyne at play.⁵⁷ Schmid notes that there is ‘no textual evidence to support this
claim [i.e. that the headaches are caused by toomuch wine]’,⁵⁸ which is true but which rules out
neither the possibility that thiswas the cause nor that Socrates conceives of it as a possible cause
and that his introduction of sophrosyne as a precondition for the cure might point the reader
in the direction of this interpretation as a possibility. Interpreted in this way, Socrates may very
well have learnt about a herbal remedy (φύλλον τι) for hangovers and would reasonably deny
the ὄφελος resulting from it unless accompanied by the ἐπῳδή (155e) which instils sophrosyne
(here presumably in the sense of moderation in drink), especially if every human ἀγαθόν truly
traces its origin to the ψυχή and if everything ὠφέλιμον is ἀγαθόν. A strikingly similar case
is recounted in the Republic,⁵⁹ where Socrates by way of example refers to those who are ruled
by ἀκολασία and refuse to change their ways, trusting in a simple φάρμακον, καύσις, τομή or
ἐπῳδή – here obviously not of the kind that awakens sophrosyne – to restore them to health;
food, drink, sex and laziness are given as the eﬃcient causes of their sickness.
⁵² ἐνέβλεψεν…ἀμήχανον τι οἷον (155c8–d1); cf. ὡς ἄμαχον λέγετε τὸν ἄνδρα, εἰ… (154d7). e natural reading
of ἀμήχανον τι οἷον is ‘too big for words’, but I think the context allows us to entertain the notion of irresistibility as
an undertone. ⁵³ 155d4. ⁵⁴ 154e1. ⁵⁵ See e.g. North, Sophrosyne, 154; Kahn, Plato and the Socratic dialogue,
187–8; Reece, ‘Drama, narrative and eros’, 68. ⁵⁶ Chrm. 155b4–5. ⁵⁷ Cf. Hyland, 41. ⁵⁸ Schmid, 175 n. 28
⁵⁹ R. 425e8–426b2.
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But there is no use denying that the main character at play in the prologue is ἔρως, which
has the eﬀect of dislocating one’s normal sense of self: the crowds are ἐκπεπληγμένοι τε καὶ
τεθορυβημένοι. e common translation of this phrase as ‘astonished and confused’⁶⁰ does
not capture the intended sense and borders on a misunderstanding. ἐκπλήττεσθαι implies the
loss of normal self-control on account of some shocking incident arousing violent passion, es-
pecially fear,⁶¹ but it is also used with eros as the logical subject.⁶² θορυβεῖσθαι in this context
designates an upsetting or excitement of the soul, but not necessarily an aporia, and certainly
not an intellectual one, but involving the passions.⁶³ In short, they were seized with passion
and lost their heads, here described from the outside, but in all likelihood having the same ex-
perience as Socrates describes himself as having at the unexpected gap in Charmides’ cloak:
ἐφλεγόμην καὶ οὐκέτ’ ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ ἦν ‘I was suddenly all ablaze and no longer able to keep a grip
of myself ’.⁶⁴ e idiomatic expression ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ recalls expressions like εἰς/ἐν ᾍδου, where
one oen, but not always, may supply οἴκῳ or equivalent, and which would render it ‘withinmy
own’ or ‘at home’.⁶⁵ It may, however, be more fortunate to compare it with similar expressions
used in similar contexts: ἐντὸς ἑαυτοῦ, which we ﬁnd in Herodotus, and the simple genitive of
the reﬂexive pronoun with γίγνεσθαι; in these cases we must regard the genitive as partitive,⁶⁶
and may translate ‘within myself ’.⁶⁷ In general all of the expressions seem to imply self-control,
composure, with the negated version as a pretty forceful expression for loss of composure, bor-
⁶⁰ ‘they were so astonished and confused’ (Sprague), ‘such was their astonishment and confusion’ (Lamb), ‘amaze-
ment and confusion reigned’ (Jowett) ⁶¹ See LSJ, s.v. ⁶² E.g. E. Hipp. 38–9: στένουσα κἀκπεπληγμένη |
κέντροις ἔρωτος; Med. 8: ἔρωτι θυμὸν ἐκπλαγεῖσ’ Ἰάσονος. Cf. also Pl. Smp. 211d4–9: τοὺς καλοὺς παῖδάς
τε καὶ νεανίσκους … οὓς νῦν ὁρῶν ἐκπέπληξαι καὶ ἕτοιμος εἶ … μήτ’ ἐσθίειν μήτε πίνειν, ἀλλὰ θεᾶσθαι μόνον
καὶ συνεῖναι. ⁶³ Cf. Pl. Lg. 640a12: ὁ μὴν ἀνδρεῖος τῶν δειλῶν ὑπὸ φόβων ἧττον τεθορύβηται; also of the
lover Hippothales in Ly. 210e5–6: ἀγωνιῶντα καὶ τεθορυβημένον ὑπὸ τῶν λεγομένων, equally mistranslated in
my opinion as ‘struggling with himself and thrown into confusion by what was being said’ by Rowe and Penner
(Plato’s Lysis, 24), who unfortunately makes this reading part of an otherwise convincing argument for ‘diﬀerent
levels of understanding on the part of the interlocutors’ (37, original emphasis): ἀγωνιᾶν occurs only three other
places in the corpus – Chrm. 162c1, Prt. 333e3 and Amat. 133a6 – in all of which it appears to convey that the
subject is ‘worked up’ or ‘agitated’, because of something that happens or something that is said; in Amat. it occurs
together with ἐκπλήττεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν καλῶν. In none of the cases is there implied any intellectual confusion. As
τεθορυβῆσθαι oen refers to a similar experience, intellectual confusion should be ruled out, especially since the
context calls for something else. Cf. also Phdr. 245b3: … μηδέ τις ἡμᾶς λόγος θορυβείτω δεδιττόμενος …, trans-
lated by Rowe as ‘and let us not be alarmed by any argument that tries to frighten us’ (Rowe (ed), Plato: Phaedrus).
⁶⁴ Reading them together it is hard not to notice striking similarities of description between the Charmides and
the Phaedrus. Here with the ἀμήχανον glance and the resulting φλέγεσθαι, there ἰδὼν τὸ ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα, πᾶσαν
αἰσθήσει διαθερμήνας τὴν ψυχήν … (Phdr. 253e5–6). ⁶⁵ So LSJ, s.v. ἐμαυτοῦ; McCabe, 13 n. 26; Newhall, 81
(‘all out-of-doors’); Mitchell, 139 (commenting on Ar. V. 642). ⁶⁶ Chantraine (104) proposes that also the ἐν
+ gen. may be an original partitive gentive. ⁶⁷ None of these idioms are in widespread use in the classical and
pre-classical literature that we possess (Rowe’s comment (Plato: Phaedrus, ad loc. 250a7) that ἐν αὑτῶν γίγνεσθαι
would be the ‘common idiom’ in contrast to αὑτῶν γίγνεσθαι makes one wonder wonder about his sources). For
the bare ἑαυτοῦ, see S. O.C. 659–60. (verse bracketed by some editors), Pl. Phdr. 250a7 (several editors have ac-
cepted Hirschig’s <ἐν> αὑτῶν), D. 2.30, 4.7; ἐντὸς ἑαυτοῦ, Hdt. 1.119, 7.47; ἐν ἑαυτοῦ, S. Ph. 950 (v.l. ἐν σαυτῷ),
Ar. V. 642 (v.l. ἐν αὑτῷ), Men. Aspis, 306–7.
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dering on temporary insanity.⁶⁸
In the Phaedrus, Socrates – in his second speech on love – has already categorised ἔρως as
a form of μανία when we receive a description of the reaction of those souls which have a suf-
ﬁcient (buried) memory of κάλλος ἀληθές, when they perceive its likeness in a human body:
ἐκπλήττονται καὶ οὐκέτ’ <ἐν> αὑτῶν γίγνονται.⁶⁹ Erotic μανία is contrasted with the sensible
ἀνθρωπίνη σωφροσύνη, which was praised in Lysias’ speech and Socrates’ ﬁrst speech, where it
is emphasised that the lover experiences a loss of self-identity (μὴ πράττῶν ταὐτὰ τῷ πρόσθεν
ὅμοιός τε ἐκείνῳ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πάλιν γένηται⁷⁰). In the second speech the emphasis is rather upon
the positive value of erotic madness if the receiving soul is in the right condition. e ἔκπληξις
is explained as the result of bodily beauty instigating recollection, ἀνάμνησις, of true κάλλος,
the hyperuranian being perceived by every human soul prior to its incarnation. e charge of
μανία is explained as the result of the lover’s neglect of τὰ κάτω, earthlymatters, which fade into
nothingness when compared to the truth of hyperurania. We can compare the behaviour of the
ordinary pederast in the closing paragraphs of Diotima’s speech, who ἐκπέπληκται and will not
eat or drink until compelled by his mortal condition, but rather only θεᾶσθαι τὰ παιδικά καὶ
συνεῖναι,⁷¹ observe and stay with his beloved; this urge to disregard the demands of ordinary
life does not abate in ὁ ὀρθῶς ἐπὶ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἐλθὼν, who in the endwill make αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν his
παιδικά. And while the necessity of an inborn φιλόσοφος φύσις is not explicit in Diotima’s de-
scription of the proper lover, this is stressed in the Republic’s account of the philosopher, who
will need both the appropriate φύσις and the correct παιδαγωγία.⁷² In the Republic, as well,
Socrates suggests the appropriateness of the insult μετεωροσκόπος as applied to the philoso-
pher,⁷³ and explains, by way of the near-blind, near-deaf skipper (the δῆμος⁷⁴) and his crew
(the politicians), that the philosophers are at best considered ἄχρηστοι by the many because of
the exclusive focus upon internal rivalry among the latter.⁷⁵ e second speech of the Phaedrus
thus retains the notion of a change in the self, but this time it is portrayed as the beginning of a
change of the soul back into its original condition, its winged state. is is what Dodds meant
when he wrote that ἔρως ‘makes the one empirical bridge between man as he is and man as he
might be’.⁷⁶
Back in the palaistra, Socrates gets drawn into the conversation with Charmides and soon
regains his composure. e external ﬂame (ἐφλεγόμην) which threatened to consume him is
exchanged for the ﬁre of life (ἀνεζωπυρούμην), and he embarks on his racian story, which
⁶⁸ Men. Aspis, 306–7 interestingly has μελαγχολῶ τοῖς πράγμασιν· μὰ τοὺς θεούς, | οὐκ εἴμ’ ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ, μαίνομαι
δ’ ἀκαρὴς πάνυ. ⁶⁹ Phdr. 250a6–7. DeVries, ad loc. rightly calls the second conjunct an epexegesis. is reaction
is ascribed to those who see the ὁμοίωμα of any hyperuranian being, but the paradigmatic case is obviously that
of beauty. ⁷⁰ Phdr. 241b2–3. ⁷¹ Smp. 211d7. ⁷² R. 491e2. ⁷³ R. 488e4, cf. 489c6. ⁷⁴ Cf. Adam, II, ad. loc.
488a7. ⁷⁵ R. 488a–489c. ⁷⁶ See p. 4.
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introduces the notion of the soul as the primus motor of good and evil for man as such:
πὰντα γὰρ ἔφη ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ὡρμῆσθαι καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τῷ σώματι καὶ παντὶ τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἐπιρρεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐπὶ τὰ ὄμματα· δεῖν οὖν ἐκεῖνο καὶ
πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα θεραπεύειν, εἰ μέλλει καὶ τὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος
καλῶς ἔχειν. θεραπεύεσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφη, ὦ μακάριε, ἐπῳδαῖς τισιν, τὰς δ’ ἐπῳδὰς
ταύτας τοὺς λὸγους εἶναι τοὺς καλούς· ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιούτωνλόγων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς σωφροσύ-
νην ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἧς ἐγγενομένης καὶ παρούσης ῥᾴδιον ἤδη εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ
καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι πορίζειν.⁷⁷
He said that indeed everything has its origin in the soul, both evil and good, for the body
and for the whole human being, wherefrom it ﬂows even as it ﬂows from the head to the
eyes. Hence one needs to treat the soul ﬁrst and most of all, if both the head and the rest
of the body parts are to reach a good condition. And he said that the soul is treated with
certain charms, and that these charms are the καλοὶ λόγοι, from which sophrosyne comes
to be in the souls. Its coming-to-be and presence makes it an easy thing to procure health
for both the head and the rest of the body.
e ﬁrst point to remark upon is the holism which is recommended, the primacy of the whole
over the parts, and the fact that the soul comes across as more than simply one of the parts of
man. It appears to be the ﬁrst principle of man, the ἀρχή, if not of his existence as such, then
of his normative condition, of good and bad. Both the holism and the concept of the soul as a
unifying principle look ahead to the discussion of ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν
καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν later on. e soul like all things can be better or worse; its well-being is
its health and it needs tending (θεραπεία) if it is to attain and remain in a state of health. What
health (ὑγίεια) is to the body, sophrosyne is to the soul. Socrates is already airing the idea that
sophrosyne is a quality of the soul, which, if true, from the outset excludes Charmides’ ﬁrst
deﬁnition, insofar as his ἡσυχιότης (calmness) functions as a predicate of actions and not of
the soul.
ere is also a certain irony at play which aﬀects the status of Charmides’ beauty. Even if it
is the ‘inner’ condition of the body which is in question here and not its outward appearance,
there is a sense in which Charmides’ outward radiance risks being exposed as an empty shell.
If his headache is the result of badness ﬂowing from soul through body as such into the head,
his body does not καλῶς ἔχειν, which within the context refers exclusively to health, but which
might just as well apply to its appearance and stature. And even if the inference from σῶμα
καλῶς ἔχον to καλὸν σῶμα (in the sense of beautiful) or καλὸς τὸ σῶμα is not valid as far as
‘everyday language’ is concerned, Plato’s Socrates is not renowned for sticking to the principles
of everyday language in such matters. Plato the philosopher is conscious of the form of word
⁷⁷ 156e6–157b1.
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and language in a way not open to the ‘ordinary man’, who remains absorbed in its function.⁷⁸
Finally there are the καλοὶ λόγοι, which I have chosen to leave untranslated, as any rendering
in English would restrict the phrase beyond its intention. As they are not mentioned again in
the dialogue, it is easy to conclude that they must refer to Socratic conversation of the kind
illustrated in the remainder of the work,⁷⁹ perhaps too easy. A digression on love will decide.
Excursus on ἔρως
In the Symposium, the wise Diotima, as related by Socrates via Aristodemus andApollodorus,⁸⁰
reveals that the universal concept of ἔρως has a two-fold object: It is a desire (1) to possess τὸ
ἀγαθόν and (2) to possess it always. e latter easily translates into a desire for ἀθανασία,
immortality, the precondition for eternal possession. Why then the common perception that
ἔρως is directed towards τὸ καλόν? Because there exists only one route to immortality for what
is by nature mortal: reproduction. e beautiful is not desired for itself, but for its suitability as
a medium of reproduction. Hence the mortal ἔρως longs for γέννησις καὶ τόκος ἐν καλῷ, i.e.
mortal immortality, and in this sense everyone is pregant (ἐγκύμων); this is the speciﬁc concept
of ἔρως. e desire for immortality is the logical consequence of the nature of the good, which
is to confer εὐδαιμονία upon the one who ‘possesses’ it. But as Aristotle aptly put it, μία χελιδὼν
ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα. e element of time necessarily implied in εὐδαιμονία expands
into immortality, but immortality of the mortal kind, immortality based on self-renewal and
reproduction.
is speciﬁc ἔρως thus becomes the telic form of the universal concept of ἔρως, its logical
consummation. Diotima says, τοὺς μὲν…ἀνθρώπους…οἴοιτ’ ἄν τις ἐκ λογισμοῦ ταῦτα ποιεῖν
⁷⁸ I agree with Alexander Nehemas to the extent that to the interpreter of theCharmides there is a certain conspic-
uousness to Socrates’ ‘having just associated kalos so strongly with sexual excitement and the loss of self-control’
before going on ‘without a moment’s hesitation to use the same word to describe the virtue of self-control itself ’
(Nehemas, ‘Beauty of body’, 100), although I believe it would be perfectly natural to a reader of the Greek text to
overlook this ‘extraordinarily stark’ contrast. Hence I would maintain that even the adverb καλῶς may be noticed
by the philosophical interpreter (contraNehemas: ‘I assume that the use of the adverb kalōs at 156a9 is too conven-
tional to carry any speciﬁc semantic weight’ (100 n. 20)); for a display of Socrates exploiting the formal connection
of the adverb καλῶς with the rest of the word group, seeAlc. 1, 116b1 ﬀ. Moreover, Nehemas’s criticism of Dover’s
restriction that ‘the word, when applied to a person, means “beautiful”, “pretty”, “handsome”, “attractive” ’ (Dover,
Symposium, 2) does not take into account that Dover most likely made his statement on the basis of ‘popular
morality’ and ordinary usage as in his more comprehensive work (Dover, Greek popular morality). us neither
the quotation of Pindar nor the language of Plato invalidates the claim of Dover. ⁷⁹ E.g. Tuckey, 18–19: ‘e
καλοὶ λόγοι … clearly refer to the Socratic method of ἔλεγχος whereby he convinced men of their own ignorance
and of the necessity of ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλεια, the essential prerequisite of virtue.’ Similarly Reece, ‘Drama, narrative
and eros’, 72, 74. ⁸⁰ Although Apollodorus admits to having conﬁrmed some details of the story with Socrates
(Smp. 173b4–6). en again the written edition of the story pushes us even further away from the actual event.
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‘One might think that humans do these things out of reasoning’.⁸¹ However, as she goes on to
point out, the impulse is not conﬁned to humans, but is shared with other living creatures,
even those without the capacity for reasoning. is fact attests to the pre-reﬂective character of
ἔρως, the primordiality which makes it so important to Platonic thought. Reading the Sympo-
sium alongside dialogues such as theMeno, the Phaedo, the Phaedrus and the Republic, one is
struck by the silence surrounding the mortality status of the ψυχή as such, which in the other
works are portrayed as truly immortal. For one must remark the careful stipulation by which
Diotima portrays κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ τρόποι, τὰ ἤθη, δόξαι, ἐπιθυμίαι, ἡδοναί, λῦπαι, φόβοι …
καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι⁸² as of mortal stock, but not αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχή. In fact, ἔρως seems to be the one
psychic element which is represented as ontologically prior to the mortal condition and as its
precondition, while being simultaneously tied to temporality.
But let us return to the distinction between universal and speciﬁc ἔρως. Socrates is perplexed
at Diotimas’ question about what one will havewhen one has gained possession of τὰ καλά, but
has no diﬃculty identifying εὐδαιμονία as the welcome result of acquiring τὰ ἀγαθά.⁸³ Wemay
surmise that this is because there is no obvious utility attached to τὸ καλόν, unless one considers
being held in high esteem as a useful consequence, a ‘good’ contributing to one’s εὐδαιμονία.
But in this case we may ask why the possession of καλά is an object of admiration. e so-
cial virtues are explainable as contributing to the good of all, in which case, insofar as they are
considered καλά, τὸ καλόν will be reduced to an ἀγαθόν. Admiration at one’s having won the
favour of a καλός person is not reducable in this way and could point to the true basis of the con-
nection between τὸ καλόν and τιμή. Or rather, it could point out that this basis is hard to com-
prehend, or perhaps better, hard to explain by the use of λόγος. In thePhaedrus-speech, τὰ τίμια
seem to be co-referential with τὰ ἐραστά, while κάλλος appears as a subcategory of these.⁸⁴ But
it seems clear that the concept of κάλλος employed by Diotima in the Symposium is more com-
prehensive than that which Socrates uses in the Phaedrus. Diotima mentions κάλλος ψυχῆς,
κάλλος ἐπιτηδεύματος and κάλλος ἐπιστήμης,⁸⁵ but notably refrains from speaking about the
form in terms of κάλλος, using instead αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν. In contrast, Socrates in the Phaedrus
praises αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος,⁸⁶ while the very fact that δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη and φρόνησις are
explicitly distinguished fromκάλλος attests to themore ‘ordinary’ use of this noun as compared
with its application to soul, practice and knowledge in the other dialogue, where it necessarily
takes on amoremetaphorical hue.⁸⁷ Nor is καλός used of anything else than the physical shape
⁸¹ Smp. 207b6–7. ⁸² Smp. 207e2–5. ⁸³ Smp. 204d–e. ⁸⁴ See Phdr. 250b1ﬀ., d3–e1. ⁸⁵ Smp. 210b7, 210d2–3,
210c7. ⁸⁶ Phdr. 250e2; cf. 249d5, 250b5, c8–d1. ⁸⁷ R.M. Dancy points out that Socrates has a ‘common habit of
referring to what he wants to deﬁne using generically abstract noun phrases such as “the pious” or “the beautiful”
instead of the abstract nouns “piety” or “beauty” ’ (77). I contend that in the particular case of κάλλος/καλόν this
is more than a habit, although it might be that as well.
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of the beloved in the Phaedrus-speech. As the context in the Phaedrus is the arguably more
poetic of the two, the diﬀerence may be traced to the diﬀerence in function between the two
concepts in the two speeches. In the Phaedrus, we are presented with κάλλος as a ὑπόμνημα,
a reminder, as either a necessary or at least a suﬃent condition for remembering the existence
of true being beyond the world; and if it is only a suﬃcient condition, it is at least a shortcut
compared to the long road by way of ἀμυδρὰ ὄργανα. On the hyperuranian ﬁeld of truth the
true κάλλος is one among all the true beings, of which are explicitly mentioned δικαιοσύνη,
σωφροσύνη and ἐπιστήμη.⁸⁸ Certainly κάλλος is conspicuous even there – it was λαμπρὸν
ἰδεῖν and μετ’ ἐκείνων ἔλαμπεν ὄν⁸⁹ – although the particular eﬀect this may have on the other
forms is not elaborated, and it is not obvious that this conspicuousnessmakes it more lovable, as
Socrates implies that an ἔρως for φρόνησις would be deeper than for κάλλος, had it only shared
in the latter’s brightness. For κάλλος stands apart in being the only form the light (φέγγος) of
which shines through even in the this-wordly ὁμοιώματα. In the Symposium by contrast the
grasp of αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν is described as the primary goal and ﬁnal end. Hence wemight say that
the κάλλος of the Phaedrus does not make the explicit connection between κάλλος as physical
beauty and τὸ καλόν as the universal form of τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ.⁹⁰
Diotima, as we have seen, idiosyncratically explains our desire for the beautiful in terms of
utility. We desire it as a medium of reproduction. But one wonders what makes the beautiful
especially suitable for reproduction. She explains: ἀνάρμοστον … ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν παντὶ τῷ
θείῳ, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἁρμόττον ‘the ugly is unﬁtting for the divine in its totality, while the beauti-
ful is ﬁtting’.⁹¹ e immediate referent of τὸ θεῖον is κύησις and γέννησις, pregnancy and birth,
as their connection with immortality marks them as divine. But how are we to conceive of this
‘explanation’?⁹² e beautiful becomes the fountain of youth, because it beﬁts the divine nature
of the act of reproduction, its essential touch of immortality. One is hard put to ﬁnd a more
‘logical’ explanation for this fact in the Symposium. But it will not hurt to try. ἀνάρμοστον
in this sentence certainly means ‘not ﬁtting to’, but the word also bears the connotation ‘badly
ﬁtted together, unharmonious’.⁹³ Similarly ἁρμόττον here means ‘beﬁtting’, although it may be
construed in other contexts as ‘making ﬁt, organising’.⁹⁴ e καλόν certainly ‘attunes’ its preg-
nant lover, who at once ἵλεών τε γίγνεται καὶ εὐφραινόμενον διαχεῖται καὶ τίκτει τε καὶ γεννᾷ
‘becomes friendly and joyfully relaxes and gives birth and reproduces’.⁹⁵ And at all stages of
human love where the lover refrains from simple rape the καλόν inspires the creation of καλοὶ
λόγοι by the lover, the κάλλος of which we must infer itself attunes the beloved and attempts
⁸⁸ Phdr. 247d6–7. ⁸⁹ Phdr. 250b5–6, d1. ⁹⁰ Smp. 210d4. ⁹¹ Smp. 206c8–d1. ⁹² Price says it ‘seems
extraneous, and sophistical’ (Love and friendship, 17). ⁹³ See e.g. R. 400d3, as antonym of εὐάρμοστον. ⁹⁴ Cf.
the soul as ἡρμοσμένη at R. 554e4; similarly 410e10, 443e2; also the tuning of λύρα and ἁρμονία at R. 349e10 and
591d2 (ἁρμόττεσθαι). ⁹⁵ Smp. 206d4–5.
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to bring him to true harmony. e Phaedrus explains how this becomes a reciprocal process
of gradually intensiﬁed love, where κάλλος in the portable, transferrable form of ἵμερος ﬂows
from beloved into lover and back from where it came;⁹⁶ similarly how the lover οἷον ἄγαλμα
τεκταίνεταί τε καὶ κατακοσμεῖ his beloved, making himmore harmonious, more κόσμιος, more
καλός, but growing himself in nobility of soul with the task.⁹⁷ Similarly in the Symposium we
ﬁnd that the advanced lover is strengthened and fattened (ῥωσθεὶς καὶ αὐξηθεὶς) by his unre-
strained intercourse with philosophy.⁹⁸ Diotima’s philosophical lover turns from the beauty
of a body to the beauty of body as such, convinced of the essential unity of all carnal beauty.
is turns him into a lover of all bodies. As this noble lover hunts his his pray with καλοὶ
λόγοι, we may conjecture that it is his discoursive interaction with a number of beautiful boys
which calls to his attention a distributive diﬀerence in response to his discourse, which again
spurs him on to consider the beauty of soul, τιμιώτερον as it were from that of the body. We
note that there is no shi from the beauty of a soul to that of soul as such, and when we get
a recapitulation of the ladder in 211c3, the soul is conspicuously missing. At this stage, in an
attempt to improve the soul of his beloved, he is compelled to attend to the beauty of customs
(ἐπιτηδεύματα, νόμοι) – what is the proper way of living? what customs make the soul bet-
ter? – the pursuit of which again makes him aware of the beauty of knowledge (ἐπιστῆμαι)
– what distinguishes proper knowledge of customs from improper? – until he hits upon the
ἐπιστήμη αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ, which, if anything is to qualify, may be worthy of the title ἐπιστήμη
ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν or at least a result of the pursuit of such wisdom.
e lover’s attentionmay ﬁnally reach the form itself, once he has gone from becoming aware
of this ἐπιστήμη as a possible object of pursuit to making it his own. But when he thus stands
contemplating the meadow of truth or even lis his mind’s eye to its ἀρχή – if we may compare
αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν to ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα in the Republic, considering the other ἐπιστῆμαι as di-
rected toward the particular forms, the one, toward the source of their appearance as forms; in
this case we may perhaps also juxtapose the ἐπαναβασμοί of the Symposium and the ἐπιβάσεις
in the Republic’s Analogy of the divided line⁹⁹ – when the successful lover thus contemplates
his newfound beauty, what does he beget? οὐκ εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς … ἀλλὰ ἀληθῆ,¹⁰⁰ not images
of virtue but the true virtue. Considering the lack of information about what happened to the
noble soul which set this train of psychological events in motion – it is apparently not trodden
under foot as a simple ἐπαναβασμός – would it be completely wrong to suggest that he never
leaves the lover’s side, and that this newly discovered true virtue goes on to be implanted in his
soul and nourished there? is would make the story ﬁt both with the account of the philo-
sophical couple in the Phaedrus, and the Allegory of the cave in the Republic. αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν
⁹⁶ Phdr. 251c5 ﬀ., 255b7 ﬀ. ⁹⁷ Phdr. 252d5 ﬀ. ⁹⁸ Smp. 210d3–7. ⁹⁹ R. 511b6. ¹⁰⁰ Smp. 212a4–5.
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emerges as the ἁρμοστής of all and everything, a true παγκοσμητής.
Charmides searches his soul
is glimpse inside Platonic ἔρως-theory – if thesemore or less mythical accounts can be called
theory – gives us a potentially fuller picture of the reference to καλοὶ λόγοι in the Charmides.
In the Symposiumwe ﬁnd καλοὶ λόγοι delivered by the proper lover at almost every stage of his
pursuit, and although it is not explicitly pointed out, we must understand that the truth of their
beauty/ﬁttingness/nobility intensiﬁes as the lover himself approaches the true καλόν. Neither
would it be completely oﬀ the mark, I think, to think of this climb towards truth as a shi from
more or less purely ‘physical’ beauty to true nobility, to use this word for convenience: e
ﬁrst λόγοι can be thought of as speeches designed to allure the beautiful boy, with an emphasis
on rhetoric in its common connotation. In the Phaedrus-speech there is no mention of καλοὶ
λόγοι, but we must remember that the speech itself is supposed to be an example of one, and
so in this dialogue as well there is a shi from speech cleverly designed to trick the παιδικά
into giving up his ‘favour’, lavishly adorned with rhetorical ﬁnesse and contemptuous of the
truth, to ‘didactic’ speech primarily directed toward the truth, although no one would deny the
pure beauty of Socrates’ second speech. Finally Socrates and Phaedrus become immersed in a
discourse on the appropriateness of λόγοι – spoken as well as written (τὸν λόγον ὅπῃ καλῶς
ἔχει λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν καὶ ὅπῃ μή, σκεπτέον¹⁰¹) – and could not this be interpreted as an
instance of the turn from ἐπιτηδεύματα to ἐπιστῆμαι? e real example, however, is the one
we ﬁnd in the Lysis, where Socrates enters into conversation with Lysis and Menexenus with
the avowed intention of showing the lover Hippothales how to converse with his beloved so
as to make him εὐάλωτος rather than δυσάλωτος.¹⁰² At the end of his ﬁrst encounter with
Lysis, he almost says aloud, οὕτω χρή, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, τοῖς παιδικοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, ταπεινοῦντα
καὶ συστέλλοντα, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ σὺ χαυνοῦντα καὶ διαθρύπτοντα ‘this, Hippothales, is the
way to converse with your beloved, humbling him and cutting him down to size, not as you
do, puﬃng him up and spoiling him’.¹⁰³ Socrates has just forced Lysis to admit that he has no
reason to be μεγαλόφρων, have high thoughts, as long as he is ἄφρων, lacking in wisdom.¹⁰⁴
is would stand as a prime example of instilling sophrosyne in the common sense, making
the youngster aware of his own limitations (γνῶναι ἑαυτοῦ) and thus respecting his elders and
betters (αἰδώς). But the conversation in the Lysis goes on to question the concept of φιλία on
the basis of which this argument was made, and in the end even questions the concept of ἔρως
¹⁰¹ Phdr. 259e1–2. ¹⁰² See. Ly. 206a6–10. e procedure is even referred to as λόγοις καὶ ᾠδαὶς κηλεῖν (206b2).
¹⁰³ Ly. 210e2–5. ¹⁰⁴ Ly. 210d7–8.
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on which the conversation as a whole was founded.
At the end of theCharmides the eponymous interlocutor hints that he considers the ἐπῳδή to
be the Socratic conversation,¹⁰⁵ but he does not spell it out in so many words, and Socrates re-
mains silent on the subject. e obvious conclusion is that Charmides just as Lysis through the
conversationwith Socrates has learnt sophrosyne as self-knowledge in the sense of awareness of
his own ignorance. One is reminded of Socrates’ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία in the Apology which con-
sists in ἐγνωκέναι ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν ‘knowing that one in truth
is of no value when it comes to wisdom’.¹⁰⁶ And Socrates’ lamentation towards the end of the
Charmides sports a superﬁcial semblance to his apology in court – δικαίως ἐμαυτὸν ᾐτιώμην
ὅτι οὐδὲν χρηστὸν περὶ σωφροσύνης σκοπῶ ‘I justly accused myself of conducting the inves-
tigation of sophrosyne without a trace of expertise’¹⁰⁷; σοι συμβουλεύσαιμι {ἂν} ἐμὲ … λῆρον
ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι καὶ ἀδύνατον λόγῳ ὁτιοῦν ζητεῖν ‘I would advise you to holdme for a fool and as
unable to seek out anything by way of reasoning’¹⁰⁸ – but on closer inspection he would rather
seem to be criticising even hismodest claim to self-knowledge in theApology, or perhaps rather
questioning the conditions for its possibility:
οὐ δυνάμεθα εὑρεῖν ἐφ᾽ ὅτῳ ποτὲ τῶν ὄντων ὁ νομοθέτης τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔθετο, τὴν
σωφροσύνην. καίτοι πολλά γε συγκεχωρήκαμεν οὐ συμβαίνονθ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ γὰρ
ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης εἶναι συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐκ ἐῶντος τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲ φάσκοντος εἶναι·
καὶ ταύτῃ αὖ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἔργα γιγνώσκειν συνεχωρήσαμεν,
οὐδὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐῶντος τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν γένοιτο ὁ σώφρων ἐπιστήμων ὧν τε οἶδεν
ὅτι οἶδεν, καὶ ὧν μὴ οἶδεν ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν. τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ παντάπασι μεγαλοπρεπῶς
συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδ᾽ ἐπισκεψάμενοι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅ τις μὴ οἶδεν μηδαμῶς, ταῦτα
εἰδέναι ἁμῶς γέ πως· ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν, φησὶν αὐτὰ εἰδέναι ἡ ἡμετέρα ὁμολογία. καίτοι,
ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχὶ ἀλογώτερον τοῦτ᾽ ἂν φανείη.¹⁰⁹
We are not able to discover to whatever being the lawgiver applied this term, sophrosyne.
is in spite of our having granted a lot which did not follow from the argument. For we
granted that there is knowledge of knowledge, even when the argument neither allowed
it nor agreed to it. We moreover granted that this knowledge knows even the objects of
the other knowledges, again without the argument allowing it, just so that we should have
the sophron knowing about what he knows, that he knows it, and about what he does not
know, that he does not know it. And in granting this we really made a magniﬁcent display
of generosity, without stopping to consider that it is impossible to somehow know what
one does not know at all – for our agreement maintains that he knows that he does not
know them. But in my opinion there is nothing which would not appear less illogical than
this.
It should be noted that Charmides says he does not believe Socrates when he says he is unable
to discover the truth about sophrosyne,¹¹⁰ and we should of course be alert to Socratic irony,
¹⁰⁵ Chrm. 176b1 ﬀ. ¹⁰⁶ Ap. 20d8, 23b3–4. ¹⁰⁷ Chrm. 175a10–11. ¹⁰⁸ Chrm. 176a2–4. ¹⁰⁹ Chrm. 175b3–c8.
¹¹⁰ Chrm. 176a7–b1.
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but if Socrates knowsmore about sophrosyne and perhapsmore about how itwould be possible
to know what one does not know, he does not let it on, and we would have to turn to theMeno
to discover it.¹¹¹ ere in fact he insists quite earnestly that he is just as smitten with ἀπορία as
his interlocutors,¹¹² but goes on to say, ὁρᾷς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις, ὡς οὐκ ἄρα
ἔστιν ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ οὔτε ὃ οἶδε οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδε; ‘Do you see what kind of eristic argument
you are bringing in, that it is possible for a man to seek for neither what he knows nor what
he does not know?’¹¹³ e impossible becomes possible, we know, through the doctrine of
recollection. If anything, ἐπιστῆμη is used in two diﬀerent senses: e immortal soul knows
everything because it has seen (ἑωρακυῖα) and thereby learnt (μεμάθηκεν) everything.¹¹⁴ But
the incarnated soul is subject to forgetfulness, and what we call μάθησις is really ἀνάμνησις.¹¹⁵
us we always know₁ what we have not yet recollected, which we say we know₂ once we have
recollected it. e ﬁrst sense of knowledge is the condition for the possibility of our being aware
of not knowing in the second sense, but this awareness itselfmust be counted as a thirdmember,
and it must be sparked, we conjecture, by a ὑπόμνημα of the kind represented by κάλλος in the
Phaedrus. ere the lovers ἐκπλήττονται καὶ οὐκέτ’ <ἐν> αὑτῶν γίγνονται, as we remember
from the discussion above,¹¹⁶ ὁ δ’ ἔστι τὸ πάθος ἀγνοοῦσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεσθαι ‘but
they do not know what they experience because they don’t perceive clearly enough [the true
beings they still retain a faint memory of]’.¹¹⁷ Can we not compare this ἔκπληξις to the Socratic
ἀπορία, which Meno likens to the numbing by a νάρκη, a stingray?
is opens up the possibility that even Socrates’ experience with Charmides’ cloak may hide
more than it lets on, and McCabe’s question does not sound so fanciful: What is it really that
Socrates’ catches sight of inside the cloak?¹¹⁸ ere is also the verb ἀνεξωπυρούμην, mentioned
above, rekindling the ﬂame of ζωή, which is incarnated life. Although this might be to go too
continental, there is no harm in thinking of the section of the Symposium where ζῆν is the
earthly life where the ζῷον is called τὸ αὐτό but in fact changes continually.¹¹⁹ Combined with
the manic story in the Phaedrus, let us entertain the thought that it was in the instance of erotic
μανία – the cloak episode – that Socrates got in touchwith his true self, while the ἀναζωπύρωσις
represents his return to common sense.
¹¹¹ Where, interestingly, Meno himself accuses Socrates of γοητεύειν, φαρμάττειν, κατεπᾴδειν (Men. 80a2–3),
and where he complains about being infected with Socrates’ ἀπορία even when before μυριάκις γε περὶ ἀρετῆς
παμπόλλους λόγους εἴρηκα καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, καὶ πάνυ εὖ, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ ἐδόκουν (80b2–3). ¹¹² Men. 80c8–d1.
¹¹³ Men. 80e1–3. ¹¹⁴ Men. 81c5–7. ¹¹⁵ Men. 81d2–3. ¹¹⁶ See p. 16. ¹¹⁷ Phdr. 250a7–b1. ¹¹⁸ Cf. McCabe,
12 ﬀ. ¹¹⁹ Smp. 207d4 ﬀ.
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Sophrosyne as ἡσυχιότης
As the only function of the ἐπῳδή is to instill sophrosyne, the next step is to ﬁnd out whether
or not Charmides already possesses the priced quality of soul. Critias breaks in and answers
in the aﬃrmative, πάνυ πολὺ δοκεῖ σωφρονέστατος εἶναι τῶν νυνί ‘of all his contemporaries
he appears to be the most sophron by far’,¹²⁰ where we should not, I think, attach too much
importance to δοκεῖ as ‘seeming’. Socrates picks up on this praise and launches into a full-
ﬂedged encomium of Charmides’ ancestors, following the example of Hippothales’ practice be-
fore Socrates shows up in the Lysis, the very procedure which he there criticises for φρονήματος
ἐμπιμπλάναι {τὰ παιδικὰ} καὶ μεγαλαυχίας.¹²¹ However, the litmus test is whether Charmides
himself will agree to possessing the virtue or not. He shows prudence and says he does not know
how to answer such a question directly. Socrates suggests an indirect route: If sophrosyne is
present for him (παρεῖναι), i.e. in him (ἐνεῖναι), it must aﬀord a perception (αἴσθησις), on the
basis of which he would have an opinion (δόξα) about what it is and of what kind.¹²² Presum-
ably, he could have an opinion of it even without possessing it, so the question is whether this
perception would of necessity render his δόξα anymore true than if it were not present, but this
question cannot be answered until the nature of sophrosyne itself becomes clearer. In eﬀect,
we must conclude that this initial question implies a principle which must itself be conﬁrmed
by a sort of hermeneutical process, hence Socrates’ apt expression, ἵνα τοπάσωμεν.¹²³
Charmides’ ﬁrst deﬁnition of sophrosyne is τὸ κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ… καὶ …
συλλήβδην ἡσυχιότης τις εἶναι ‘to do everything in an orderly and quietly, and to be in short
a certain quietness’.¹²⁴ It has oen enough been pointed out that Socrates goes on to ignore
κοσμίως,¹²⁵ and he chooses to focus on the particular connotation of ἡσυχιότης as ‘slowness’. I
think Santas is correct in suggesting that this choice of Socrates indicates that it is not κοσμίως
which poses a problem,¹²⁶ and I disagree with those who hold that this is an ‘arbitrary’ inter-
pretation.¹²⁷ ἡσύχιος excludes ταχύς, as applied to one and the same action, even if it is more
than simply just its opposite, so this (necessary) aspect of ἡσυχιότης is all Socrates needs to
show that this deﬁnition of sophrosyne is faulty, given that sophrosyne is always καλόν, while
in some cases ἡσυχιότης in action is less καλόν than ταχυτής, hence it is not strictly καλόν, as
¹²⁰ Chrm. 157d6–7. ¹²¹ Ly. 206a4; cf. 205c2–d4. ¹²² Chrm. 158e7–159a3. ¹²³ Chrm. 159a9. ¹²⁴ Chrm.
159b3–5. ¹²⁵ E.g. Heitsch, 10. Santas points out that it is really Charmides himself which ‘drops’ κοσμίως (113
n. 7), but this only reﬂects Santas’ strange choice to categorise this ﬁrst utterance on the subject as two separate
deﬁnitions (108). In my opinion, κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ, with the example of walking and talking,
is Charmides’ key to disambiguate the otherwise ambiguous ἡσυχιότης. ¹²⁶ Santas, 113 n. 7. ¹²⁷ So in Kahn,
Plato and the Socratic dialogue, 189 n. 11. Again Santas, who writes: ‘Why compare quietly with quickly? ey
are certainly not exclusive of each other, else what the safe-cracker and the burglar aim at would not be simply
diﬃcult but logically impossible.’ (115) ‘Quietly’ may not be exclusive of ‘quickly’, but ἡσύχιος is.
26 Platonic sophrosyne
it ‘partakes’ in the αἰσχρόν (to borrow an expression from the ‘middle’ dialogues).¹²⁸
I do not understand the great fuzz about the alleged fallacies of this argument, which seems
tome perfectly sound. Socrates does nowhere claim that sophrosyne is ταχυτής,¹²⁹ nor does he
really say that it is more sophron than ἡσυχιότης as such,¹³⁰ only that it is not less so.¹³¹ Even
the fact that ἡσυχιότης τις couldmean ‘a certain kind of ἡσυχιότης’ does not avoid the exclusion
of ταχυτής when applied to action (and even if applied to a person one would not say that he
is both ἡσύχιος and ταχύς of character, but perhaps with the former applied to character, the
latter to physical ability).
If we are to accept Socrates’ earlier indications that sophrosyne is a quality of the soul, Charmides’
primary error is that he deﬁnes it as a quality of action. For even though the abstract ἡσυχιότης
could well be a quality of the soul,¹³² this is clearly not how he intends it. His use of κοσμίως
is interesting, insofar as it is an important aspect of sophrosyne in the Gorgias, and a deﬁn-
ing feature of sophrosyne in the Republic. It is moreover noteworthy that neither Socrates nor
Charmides has any qualms about taking for granted an aspect of what kind of thing (ὁποῖόν τι)
sophrosyne is, namely καλόν τι. And having read the Symposium we would perhaps be more
careful about unreﬂectively aﬃrming what is καλόν and what is αἰσχρόν, unless we had already
perfected the ἐπιστήμη αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ, but this does not seem to bother the Socratically ig-
norant Socrates at this point.
But the import of ἡσυχιότης should not be lost on us. In book 6 of the Republic we read:
εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἕπεται καὶ νεανικοί
τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας οἶσθ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἅμα φύεσθαι οἷοι κοσμίως
μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιότητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν, ἀλλ’ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ ὀξύτητος φέρονται ὅπῃ
ἂν τύχωσιν, καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἅπαν αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται.¹³³
ose who are quick learners and have good memory and quick to comprehend and in
general quick of mind, and all of the like, and those that are eager and noble of mind –
¹²⁸ Cf. the section on comparatives later on (168b5 ﬀ.), where we could easily supply that if something is κάλλιόν
τινος, it is κάλλιον αἰσχίονός τινος. ¹²⁹ Cf. Lutoslawski, 203: ‘It is characteristic of the stage of logical advance
which Plato had reached when he wrote this small work, that his Socrates commits a paralogism, inferring from
the beauty of both temperance and quickness that quickness is temperate (159d).’ ¹³⁰ Cf. Tuckey’ summary,
19 n.: ‘σωφροσύνη τῶν καλῶν ἐστί 160b, but oen ταχυτής is κάλλιον rather than ἡσυχιότης, therefore oen
σωφρονέστερον than ἡσυχιότης, therefore σωφροσύνη cannot be ἡσυχιότης τις, ἔκ γε τούτου τοῦ λόγου.’ It is true
that Socrates says at 159d10–11 that οὐ τοίνουν κατά γε τὸ σῶμα ἡ ἡσυχιότης ἂν ἀλλ’ ἡ ταχυτὴς σωφρονέστερον
εἴη, ἐπειδὴ καλὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη, which strictly speaking does not follow unless we take it that καλόν is not only a
necessary, but a suﬃcient, condition of sophrosyne, which would be very strange. But the phrasing here is more
rhetorical than strictly logical, as is shown by the fact that it is absent from themeticulous conclusion at 160b7–d3.
¹³¹ See Chrm. 160c2–d3. Santas generously concludes (116–17): ‘Looked at in this way, Socrates’ argument is,
I think, convincing, though from the point of view of impeccable logic it still remains faulty. It remains faulty
because Socrates has not produced a single case of quietness of behavior which, so characterized and no further, is
either not praiseworthy or disgraceful.’ He means the fact that Socrates throughout has used ἡσυχῇ καὶ βραδέως,
for which see above. ¹³² Cf. Irwin’s distinction between ‘A-’ and ‘B-powers’ (Plato’s moral theory, 45). ¹³³ R.
503c2–7 (Adam’s emended text).
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you know that they are not wont to be born as also disposed to want to live in an orderly
fashion, calmly and steadfastly. Rather, those of such a disposition are borne wherever
their eagerness carries them, and the steadfastness is long since gone.
Wemust be aware that we are here talking about more or less natural dispositions. e context
is that of attempting to single out among the φύλακες those that are worthy of philosophy.
κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιότητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν refers in particular to the disposition to face
fear in battle with calmness. ἀνδρεία, courage, was in book 4 designated as a virtue belonging
particularly to the θυμοειδές, the spirited part of the soul,¹³⁴ and was deﬁned as σωτηρία διὰ
παντὸς δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου δεινῶν τε πέρι καὶ μὴ ‘a keeping safe through everything
of correct and lawful opinion about what is terrible and not’.¹³⁵ Still, ἡσυχία is in this case
not an aspect of the soul, but akin to Charmides’ examples of walkng and talking. For ἡσυχία
explicitly connected to the soul we must turn to the discussion of pleasure and pain in book
9,¹³⁶ where it represents the state between pleasure and pain, the lack of both. Since ἀνδρεία is
in particular the ability to save its correct opinion through λῦπαι, ἡδοναί, ἐπιθυμίαι, φόβοι,¹³⁷
we can relate the mention of ἡσυχία in the above quote to the ἐπιθυμητικόν, the desiring part of
the soul,¹³⁸ as the courageous man depends upon a comparative calmness in his baser desires
to be able to withstand. Perhaps we can think of ἡσυχιότης as an essential component of the
ἕξις of the ἐπιθυμητικόν insofar as ἁρμονία, συμφωνία, φιλία and ὁμόνοια, i.e. sophrosyne, is
to be possible in the tripartite soul of the Republic.
Sophrosyne as αἰδώς
Socrates encourages Charmides to take another look into himself (εἰς σεαυτὸν ἐμβλέψας¹³⁹)
– another amusing hint about self-knowledge – and try again. is time he answers: δοκεῖ
τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, αἰσχύνεσθαι ποιεῖν ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ αἰσχυντηλὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ εἶναι
ὅπερ αἰδὼς ἡ σωφροσύνη. ‘In that case, he said, sophrosyne seems to me to make a man feel
shame, and to make him prone to shame, and sophrosyne seems to be the very same thing as
shame.’¹⁴⁰ is time Charmides is formally closer to themark, insofar as he so to speak keeps to
the soul. But Aristotle might have been on to something when he wrote that αἰδώς is more akin
to πάθος than to ἕξις,¹⁴¹ and if we are to stay with the analogy with ὑγίεια, sophrosyne must
be more like a ἕξις than a πάθος, but we should not push this distinction too far.¹⁴² In fact,
in the Phaedrus αἰδώς seems to ﬁgure as a ἕξις, or perhaps rather as the third member of the
¹³⁴ R. 441d1–2, with 429b1–3 and 439e2 ﬀ. ¹³⁵ R. 430b2–4. ¹³⁶ R. 583c7 ﬀ. ¹³⁷ R. 429c9–d1, 430b1. ¹³⁸ R.
580d10–581a1 informs us that this name is given to it because of the σφοδρότης of ‘carnal’ desires, while the part
as such is πολυειδές, and in spite of the fact that all three parts have their special ἐπιθυμίαι. ¹³⁹ Chrm. 160d6,
but codd.has ἀποβλέψας/ἀπεμβλέψας. ¹⁴⁰ Chrm. 160e3–5. ¹⁴¹ Arist. EN 1128b11. ¹⁴² Cf. Cairns, 373.
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Aristotelian soul, a δύναμις,¹⁴³ when the noble horse is called τιμῆς ἐραστὴς μετὰ σωφροσύνης
τε καὶ αἰδοῦς, καὶ ἀληθινῆς δόξης ἑταῖρος ‘a lover of honour, having sophrosyne and shame,
and a comrade of true opinion’.¹⁴⁴
Socrates gets rid of this deﬁnition by bringing to bear another ‘intuition’ about sophrosyne,
namely that the sophron man is ἀγαθός, then making a somewhat strange inference: What is
ἀγαθόν cannot ἀπεργάζεσθαι μὴ ἀγαθούς, cannot produce not-good men. We are tempted to
ask, Good for whom?¹⁴⁵ ere are three ways of saving the argument.
1. To be ἀγαθός can be construed as being good for oneself, disposed to one’s own ad-
vantage. Here we can compare Ly. 206b6–8, where Socrates and Hippothales agree
that it would be a mark of great stupidity to think a poet ἀγαθός if he was βλαβερὸς
ἑαυτῷ. In this case, when Socrates quotes Homer – αἰδὼς δ’ οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ
παρεῖναι, ‘shame is not a good companion for aman in need’¹⁴⁶ – the point is that whereas
sophrosyne is something essentially ἀγαθόν, and therefore always good for its possessor,
αἰδώς on the authority of Homer is not, and must therefore be both good and not-good.
2. ἀγαθόν might in its application both to the possessor and the possessum be construed as
(a) unconditionally good, i.e. not merely advantageous, or (b) good for someone other
than its possessor.
3. αἰδώς could be construed as a disposition, a δύναμις, and this would perhaps remove
the harshness of the argument. If a disposition is an ἀγαθόν, this could simply mean
that it is a quality in virtue of which the possessor of this quality is ἀγαθός, in the way
that the possessor of κάλλος is καλός, or for that matter in the way that the presence of
σωφροσύνη makes one σώφρων. e only problem with this interpretation is the quote
from the Odyssey, where οὐκ ἀγαθή does mean ‘advantageous to’ and not simply the
quality which renders its possessor good. However, there is no one to stop Socrates from
ignoring the intended meaning of the verse. Although one has attempted to read more
into the function of the quote,¹⁴⁷ I believe this to bemisguided. Socrates simply descends
on παρεῖναι and construes it the same way as with σωφροσύνη earlier on,¹⁴⁸ so that if
ἀγαθόν πάρεστι it renders its bearer ἀγαθός.¹⁴⁹
¹⁴³ Although Aristotle’s concept is construed as essentially normative, not simply as a psychological disposition.
¹⁴⁴ Phdr. 253d66–7. ¹⁴⁵ Cf. Cairns, 373 n. 88. ¹⁴⁶ Hom. Od. 17.347. ¹⁴⁷ Irwin, Plato’s ethics, 37: ‘We
sometimes condemn shame as bad, if people are wrongly ashamed of doing an action that is in fact ﬁne and
virtuous, so that they display shame on the wrong occasions.’ R. F. Stalley points out that the quote refers to
Odysseus-the-beggar and that therefore ‘whether a sense of shame is not appropriate depends on one’s social
position’ (266). Irwin interprets αἰδώς as a πάθος, Stalley, as a δύναμις. ¹⁴⁸ See p. 25. ¹⁴⁹ At Euthd. 301a1 ﬀ.
Dionysodoros makes Socrates regret this construal of παρεῖναι with κάλλος, asking ἐὰν οὖν … παραγένηταί σοι
βοῦς, βοῦς εἶ, καὶ ὅτι νῦν ἐγώ σοι πάρειμι, Διονυσόδωρος εἶ;
Charmides: the question of sophrosyne 29
We already saw that αἰδώς is coupled with sophrosyne in the noble horse of the Phaedrus-
speech, although it is notoriously diﬃcult to know what sense of sophrosyne is intended. More
important is the fact that αἰδώς is coupledwith the noble horse, which is normally interpreted as
corresponding to the θυμοειδές in theRepublic.¹⁵⁰ Douglas Cairns argues convincingly that it is
also associated with the θυμοειδές in the Republic itself.¹⁵¹ If we accept this, I think we can also
make a case for αἰδώς being made into a disposition of the θυμοειδές in the process by which
the latter is made ἥμερον (coupled with κόσμιον at R. 410e3). e term ἥμερον is associated
with σωφροσύνη in the Republic,¹⁵² but also seems to be reserved for the θυμοειδές, and may
thus represent the particular condition necessary for the θυμοειδές to be able to enter into the
friendly harmony that is sophrosyne. ἥμερος is the opposite of ἄγριος, and recalls ‘wild’ and
‘tame’ when applied to animals, but bears also the connotation ‘civilised, cultured’ when applied
to humans, and the fact that it is associated with the φιλόσοφος φύσις at 410e1 strengthens the
feeling that it means more than simply ‘soened’ and may imply a rational element, as does the
fact that it is cultivated by μουσική.
Critias is spurred to action
Charmides now gets carried away, and quits his attempt to catch sight of sophrosyne within
himself. Rather, he relates a deﬁnition he has heard from someone else, and it soon becomes
obvious that it is Critias who is the source. It runs: τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν ‘to do one’s own
things’.
Sophrosyne as τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν
Socrates contends that it sounds like a riddle, since οὐ δήπου ᾗ τὰ ῥήματα ἐφθέγξατο ταύτῃ
καὶ ἐνόει ‘he (sc. ὁ λέγων) obviously did not mean by his words what he uttered’.¹⁵³ Excluding
the article, all three words would need to be clariﬁed: Who or what is referred to by ἑαυτοῦ?
What is it that really belongs, i.e. is οἰκεῖον, to this subject? What is meant by πράττειν? In
reality, of course, the expression as a whole is politically loaded, and means the opposite of
¹⁵⁰ But Ferrari’s suggestion (Listening to the cicadas, 202) that the two horses and its charioteer rather are ‘pictures
of whole persons waiting to be summoned into being’ is very interesting. ¹⁵¹ Cairns, 381–92. I also think that
the evidence in the Phaedrus is even stronger than he admits: At 383 n. 117 he refers to Phdr. 256a5–6 ‘where
the two better parts of the soul resist “with aidōs and reason” ’, but I think the fact that the noble horse already has
been associated with αἰδώς makes it reasonable to construe the μετ’ αἰδοῦς καὶ λόγου as distributive, the former
belonging to the horse, the latter to the charioteer. Similarly, Cairns writes that at 254e9 ‘the whole soul follows the
beloved with aidōs’ (384), where δεδιυῖαν clearly refers to the chastened dark horse, making it natural to couple
αἰδουμένην with the white horse. Of course, Cairns is not wrong, he simply presents the neutral translations
without emphasising what is implicit. ¹⁵² E.g. R. 410e10, 441e8–442a2.. ¹⁵³ Chrm. 161d1–2.
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πολυπραγμονεῖν; Socrates’ ‘innocent’ use of the latter a few lines further on reveals that he
knows this perfectly well. His reason for being so diﬃcult is that this interpretation is com-
pletely useless as a deﬁnition of sophrosyne, since we would be back in the sphere of actions,
while sophrosyne is a quality of the soul. He wants to see whether there is another interpre-
tation which shows more promise. us he begins by ridiculing the thought that sophrosyne
means writing only one’s own name, or making and washing only one’s own clothes etc. We
get the impression that he sinks this low to provoke Critias into defending his λόγος.¹⁵⁴ When
Charmides decides to assist Socrates in this mission, blurting out that ἴσως οὐδὲν κωλύει μηδὲ
τὸν λέγοντα μηδὲν εἰδέναι ὅτι ἐνόει ‘perhaps there is a good chance that even the one who said
it has not got a clue about what he meant by it’,¹⁵⁵ Critias can control himself no longer. He
defends his deﬁnition as follows:
(1) πράττειν and ἐργάζεσθαι are synonymous, but ποιεῖν is amore comprehensive term. Like
Socrates, Critias exploits a poet, this time Hesiod. Unlike Socrates, the authority of Hesiod
seems necessary for his claim to hold, as the distinction in itself ﬁnds no support in common
usage, and his interpretation of the verse is quite ad hoc, too use no stronger word. He main-
tains that πράττειν and ἐργάζεσθαι implies that their ‘products’ are καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως
ποιούμενα. (2) τὰ καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως ποιούμενα, which Socrates goes on to simply call τὰ
ἀγαθά, is in fact what is meant by τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, τὰ οἰκεῖα.
e latter would of course by itself have suﬃced, and this proposed identity between τὰ
ἀγαθά and τὰ οἰκεῖα is enticing. At once we think of other dialogues where the relation be-
tween the two is called into question. Diotima points out the identity as a possibility at Smp.
205e6–7, while the discussion of φιλία in the Lysis founders on it.¹⁵⁶ But while Diotima follows
Critias in seeing τὸ ἀγαθόν as providing the conceptual content, the appellation οἰκεῖον seem-
ing quite arbitrary, the Lysis in fact suggests that οἰκεῖον is not the same as ἀγαθόν, perhaps even
that τὸ ἀγαθόν as the πρῶτον φίλον is φίλον because it is οἰκεῖον: In the last attempt at a deﬁni-
tion Socrates hints at an ἀγαθόν which is not simply ὠφέλιμον because of some κακόν, but one
that would remain even if all worldly κακά were to vanish; he suggests that ἐπιθυμία, ἔρως and
φιλία – desire in general – would still exist, and to desire is to be lacking (ἐνδεές), to be lacking
is to have something taken away (ἀφαιρεῖσθαι), and this would be something which belongs to
one (οἰκεῖον). Socrates then slips in φύσει οἰκεῖον without explicit justiﬁcation, but the qual-
iﬁcation hearkens back to the proposed basic status of desire, and receives some legitimacy
therefrom. Socrates does not get the chance to probe any deeper in the Lysis, but the reader
wonders when the φύσει οἰκεῖον has been removed from the desiring entity, which in this case
is the ψυχή.¹⁵⁷ Our thoughts wander back to the Symposium and the myth of Aristophanes,
¹⁵⁴ Cf. Phdr. 275e. ¹⁵⁵ Chrm. 162b9–10. ¹⁵⁶ Ly. 220b6–222d8. ¹⁵⁷ Ly. 222a3.
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then to the Phaedrus and the pinioned soul imprisioned in ﬂesh. We learn that the mind of the
gods and their equivalents ἰδοῦσα διὰ χρόνου τὸ ὂν ἀγαπᾷ τε καὶ θεωροῦσα τἀληθῆ τρέφεται
καὶ εὐπαθεῖ ‘beholding the being over time and comes to love it, and watching the truth it is
nourished and enjoys itself ’,¹⁵⁸ which reminds one of the foundation of a child’s love for the
parent, his οἰκεῖος, the kind of φιλία which is ﬁrst to be discussed in the Lysis,¹⁵⁹ a discussion
which is not resumed, but le hanging when Menexenus returns from sacriﬁcing. Moreover,
in the Phaedrus it is only νοῦς which is able to see the hyperuranian beings. en, in the First
Alcibiades it is hinted that the true self is νοῦς.¹⁶⁰ And ﬁnally, in book 9 of the Republic, during
the discussion of the diﬀerent ἐπιθυμίαι and their respective ἡδοναί, we read:
τί οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ· θαρροῦντες λέγωμεν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὸ φιλοκερδὲς καὶ τὸ φιλόνικον ὅσαι
ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσίν, αἳ μὲν ἂν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ λόγῳ ἑπόμεναι καὶ μετὰ τούτων τὰς ἡδονὰς
διώκουσαι, ἃς ἂν τὸ φρόνιμον ἐξηγῆται, λαμβάνωσι, τὰς ἀληθεστάτας τε λήψονται, ὡς
οἷόν τε αὐταῖς ἀληθεῖς λαβεῖν, ἅτε ἀληθείᾳ ἑπομένων, καὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν οἰκείας, εἴπερ τὸ
βέλτιστον ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτο καὶ οἰκειότατον;¹⁶¹
What, then, said I, shall we conﬁdently proclaim that also regarding the desires associated
with the part which loves gain and the part which loves victory will those desires which
follow knowledge and reason and which pursue their pleasures in company with them –
the pleasures which the wise part prescribes, and thus reap their pleasures – these desires
will reap the truest pleasures to the maximum extent possible for them – because they
follow truth – i.e. those pleasures that belong to them, if indeed that which is best for each
thing is also what most belongs to it.
Let us leave the orphaned soul and return to theCharmides. e situation is now that sophrosyne
= τὸ τἀγαθὰ πράττειν. Socrates probes this deﬁnition by asking whether it holds even if the
agent is unaware of whether he has acted to his own advantage or not, if οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτὸν
ὡς ἔπραξεν ‘he does not know about himself how he has fared’.¹⁶² e reason behind the intro-
duction of this thought must be that Critias deﬁnition simply becomes too general. Moreover,
the the question of what really is ἀγαθόν has not been asked, and Socrates might be unsatisﬁed
about the stipulated meaning of τὰ ἑαυτοῦ. In any case, sophrosyne harbours an association
with self-awareness, and Critias will not tolerate the lack of it, so he retracts his deﬁnition.
Having read theRepublicwe know that τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν becomes the famous deﬁnition
of δικαιοσύνη in book 4. Aer establishing this as a deﬁnition of δικαιοσύνη in the city, and
having justiﬁed the division of the soul into three parts, Socrates reminds Glaucon that the
cobbler cobbling or the carpenter doing carpentry was an εἴδωλον:
¹⁵⁸ Phdr. 247d3–4. ¹⁵⁹ Strictly speaking it is the parents’ love for the child which is discussed, but the relation
between οἰκεῖοι remains the same. ¹⁶⁰ Alc. 1, 133b–c; hereaer referred to in the text as ‘the Alcibiades’. For a
defence of the authenticity of this dialogue, see Annas, ‘Self-knowledge’, 111–15; Denyer, Plato: Alcibiades, 14–26.
¹⁶¹ R. 586d4–e2. Cf. 585d11: εἰ ἄρα τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων ἡδύ ἐστι … ¹⁶² Chrm. 164c1.
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τὸ δέ γε ἀληθές, τοιοῦτόν τι ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀλλ᾽ οὐ περὶ τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν τῶν
αὑτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντός, ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ ἐάσαντα τἀλλότρια
πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὑτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, ἀλλὰ
τῷὄντι τὰ οἰκεῖα εὖ θέμενον καὶ ἄρξαντααὐτὸναὑτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γενόμενον
ἑαυτῷ καὶ συναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, ὥσπερ ὅρους τρεῖς ἁρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς, νεάτης τε καὶ
ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης, καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξὺ τυγχάνει ὄντα, πάντα ταῦτα συνδήσαντα καὶ
παντάπασιν ἕνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον, οὕτω δὴ πράττειν ἤδη,
ἐάν τι πράττῃ ἢ περὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἢ περὶ σώματος θεραπείαν ἢ καὶ πολιτικόν τι ἢ
περὶ τὰ ἴδια συμβόλαια, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἡγούμενον καὶ ὀνομάζοντα δικαίαν μὲν καὶ καλὴν
πρᾶξιν ἣ ἂν ταύτην τὴν ἕξιν σῴζῃ τε καὶ συναπεργάζηται, σοφίαν δὲ τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν
ταύτῃ τῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμην, ἄδικον δὲ πρᾶξιν ἣ ἂν ἀεὶ ταύτην λύῃ, ἀμαθίαν δὲ τὴν ταύτῃ
αὖ ἐπιστατοῦσαν δόξαν.¹⁶³
But in truth, justice was something like this, it would seem, but not concerned with the
doing of that which is one’s own but is external, but with that which is internal, really and
truly concerned with oneself and that which is one’s own, not allowing each thing within
oneself to do what does not belong to it nor allowing the principles of the soul to meddle
in the aﬀairs of each other, but really taking proper care of that which belongs to one and
ruling oneself and ordering oneself and becoming friendly with oneself and harmonising
oneself, being in three parts, like three notes of a harmony, the lowest, the highest and the
mean, and if there happen to be others in between – combining them all and becoming
in every way one from many, sophron and harmonised, and being in this condition to
act, whether one concerns oneself with the acquisition of money or tending the body or
politics or private contracts – in all of these matters holding and naming just and ﬁne the
action which upholds and helps complete this condition, wisdom, the knowledge which
is in charge of this action, unjust, the action which at any time dissolves this condition,
ignorance, the opinion which is in charge of this action.
We see what has been pointed out by many before us, that δικαιοσύνη and sophrosyne in the
Republic are very closely connected. But that each of them requires the other and can only exist
together does not mean that they as such cannot be distinguished. δικαιοσύνη is the condition
in which each part does what belongs to it, sophrosyne is the condition of these parts acting
together, coordinating their particular aﬀairs, in a friendly manner; the soul as such exhibits
ὁμόνοια, it acts as one. I have suggested that this requires (1) that the ἐπιθυμητικόν sports a
comparative ἡσυχία, and (2) that the θυμοειδές has been cultivated, made ἥμερον, which at least
includes, if it does not consist in, its acquiring αἰδώς. Nowwemay add (3) that none of the parts
should interfere with what truly belongs to one of the others. But we saw in book 9 that the two
lower part cannot truly know what truly belongs to them, what is their own, as the only part
which is able to acquire knowledge is the λογιστικόν. us this third condition of sophrosyne,
i.e. δικαιοσύνη, requires knowledge about the self, i.e. knowledge about what belongs to each
of its parts, this being the particular objects aimed at by their respective ἐπιθυμίαι. Otherwise
ὠφελίμως πράξας ἢ βλαβερῶς … οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἔπραξεν.¹⁶⁴
¹⁶³ R. 443c9–444a2. ¹⁶⁴ Chrm. 164b11–c1.
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Sophrosyne as τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν
We concluded¹⁶⁵ that self-knowledge in the sense of knowing that one does not know some-
thing – and thus, we can now add, making it possible to be aware of this object of possible
knowledge as something φύσει οἰκεῖον and hence as an object worth pursuing (ζητεῖν) – should
be something other than both the kind omniscience truly possessed by every immortal soul and
the kind of knowledge possessed by the incarnated soul aer having recollected it. Nowwe will
see how self-knowledge is treated in the Charmides.
Critias immediately seizes on Socrates’ hint and declares that sophrosyne is τὸ γιγνώσκειν
ἑαυτόν. Socrates gets him to agree that if it is γιγνώσκειν, it must be an ἐπιστήμη, and every
ἐπιστήμη has its proper object.¹⁶⁶ What is more, it should be useful (χρησίμη) to us.¹⁶⁷ He
ﬁrst tries to make Critias show what useful product sophrosyne has to oﬀer, but Critias replies
that not every ἐπιστήμη has an external product, using the example ofmaths. Socrates contends
that at least all ἐπιστῆμαι has an external object, but Critiasmakes the crucial point: Sophrosyne
diﬀers from every other ἐπιστήμη at precisely this point, that it does not have an external object,
but is τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη … καὶ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς ‘knowledge of both the other
knowledges and of itself ’.
is is the famous move from ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ to ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς. Can the move be de-
fended? It suggests that the self is ἐπιστήμη and nothing more. ἐπιστήμη in Greek can mean
either (1) science or (2) knowledge (as a state of the soul), so the suggestion would be that the
self is knowledge. In the Alcibiades, which also discusses what is meant by γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν,
Socrates argues ﬁrst that the ψυχή is properly ἑαυτόν, what one is, while the body parts are τὰ
ἑαυτοῦ, on the principle that that which uses (χρῆσθαι) and rules (ἄρχειν) something is diﬀer-
ent from what it uses and rules, and since a human being uses his body, he is diﬀerent from it,
and the soul too uses and rules the body, making the human being identical with its soul.¹⁶⁸
en he argues that on analogy with sight and the eye, the soul has the greatest possibility of
perceiving (γνῶναι) itself if it looks (1) to that place (τόπος) within itself where the virtue of
the soul, i.e. σοφία, comes to be, or (2) to that whatever similar (ὅμοιον) to this place: τῷ θεῷ
ἄρα τοῦτ’ ἔοικεν αὐτῆς, καί τις εἰς τοῦτο βλέπων καὶ πᾶν τὸ θεῖον γνούς, θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν,
οὕτω καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἂν γνοίη μάλιστα ‘so this part of the soul is similar to god, and if one were
to look into it and perceive all the divine, god and wisdom, thus he would also best come to
know himself ’.¹⁶⁹ is would correspond to ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης. In the following lines, which
is only present in Eusebius, it is suggested that god would be a better mirror (λαμπρότερον) for
the soul than its own wisdom, in the same way as a mirror-surface would be a better mirror for
¹⁶⁵ See p. 24. ¹⁶⁶ Chrm. 165c4–6. ¹⁶⁷ Chrm. 165c10 ﬀ. ¹⁶⁸ Alc. 1, 129b5 ﬀ. ¹⁶⁹ Alc. 1, 133b7–c6.
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the eye than the surface of another eye. e analogy with the eye suggests that it might not be
necessary to look to one’s own wisdom, but that of someone else, turning the dialogue into the
foundation of self-knowledge. Similarly, in the Phaedrus, the beloved turned lover looks to his
lover and ὥσπερ … ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν λέληθεν ‘like in a mirror he sees
himself in his lover, but the fact escapes his notice’.¹⁷⁰ Julia Annas calls this correspondence be-
tween the two dialogues a ‘superﬁcially similar image’,¹⁷¹ but we must not forget the emphasis
that has been put in the Phaedrus-speech on κάλλος as λαμπρόν and as a reminder of one’s true
being, and it is precisely κάλλος which in the transportable form of ἵμερος has ﬂowed from the
beloved into the lover, so that he does indeed see himself, i.e. the only aspect of himself which is
both perceptible by the senses and retains some of the φέγγος of truth. e Phaedrus suggests
that ‘perceiving’ φρόνησις is a much trickier aﬀair, where one would, I believe, be forced to use
ἀμυδρὰ ὄργανα.
We would not think that Critias has any of this in mind. And we saw above that the upshot
of the lengthy argument in the Charmides is that this ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης perhaps could have
the advantage of knowing that the soul knows what it knows and does not know what it does
not know. Socrates ﬁnds the very idea that a δύναμις as he calls it should be directed towards
itself, since it would then also have the οὐσία of that to which it is directed,¹⁷² and this would
presumably lead to an inﬁnite regress: knowledge of knowledge of knowledge of knowledge
… What we have seen in the Symposium and the Phaedrus can perhaps point to a solution:
the element of time. ἐπιστήμη in the sense of worldly knowledge must reproduce itself, i.e.
conﬁrm itself, at every moment; it is knowledge of a ﬁnite form. If this does not hold for the
true knowledge which has grasped the idea of the good and/or beautiful, it should at least hold
for an awareness of what one does and does not know.
Socrates leaves the question of the possibility of such a power hanging, turning to the use-
fulness it would have granted that it is possible. e ﬁrst suggestion holds some promise: this
knowledge would make it possible to choose those who do have knowledge within a particular
area to do the job within that area. Sophrosyne thus directing and ruling everybody else would
produce maximum εὐδαιμονία. But Socrates has some misgivings, and asks if επιστημόνως
πράττειν = εὖ πράττειν, then ἐπιστημόνως τίνος? Critias is forced to say that the relevant
ἐπιστήμη would have as its object the good and the bad.¹⁷³ Socrates, however, points out that
this knowledge of good and bad is not knowledge of knowledge, and so if knowledge of good
and bad is the necessary and suﬃcient condition for action performed by any other art, cra
or science to be advantageous, sophrosyne as knowledge of knowledge would not be advanta-
geous, and this would be unacceptable.¹⁷⁴ Critias points out that if sophrosyne controls every
¹⁷⁰ Phdr. 255d6. ¹⁷¹ Annas, ‘Self-knowledge’, 132 n. 52. ¹⁷² Chrm. 168d1–3. ¹⁷³ Chrm. 174b10. ¹⁷⁴ Chrm.
174c9–d7.
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other knowledge, it would also control the knowledge of good and bad, and would ὠφελεῖν in
this way.¹⁷⁵ But Socrates clings to the notion that every branch of knowledge has its own object,
so if there is another knowledge of the good which is the true source of advantage/goodness,
knowledge of knowledge would not add to this goodness; it seems to be redundant.
Read together with the Meno, we might read between the lines that what sophrosyne really
is, is not a full-ﬂedged knowledge, but an awareness of possible objects of knowledge, so that its
advantage would be tied to temporality: It is advantageous to the extent that is not yetmaster of
these objects of knowledge, thus neither is one able to control the other knowledges which one
does not yet possess. If one had before one a doctor and could verify that he knew the art of
medicine, sophrosyne would no longer be of use in relation to this particular area of knowledge.
What then about our ongoing dialogue with theRepublic? Wementioned in connection with
the Analogy of the dived line that the dialectician of the Republic grasps the idea of the good
which is the ἀρχή of the other forms. But he also descends again and uses his grasp of the good
to understand the other forms, thus getting a precise grasp of the other branches of knowledge.
is is the knowledge of the good, and of any other knowledge, which the λογιστικόν brings to
bear upon the relationship between the parts of the soul which is sophrosyne. Wemust remem-
ber that the arts and cras and any individual correctness of ‘orientation in the environment’
must be eﬀected in the world of sense, and thus will presumably require the eﬀort of the whole
soul, as well as the knowledge of the λογιστικόν in particular.
¹⁷⁵ Chrm. 174d8–e2.

In conclusion
I have argued for the possibility of viewing all the proposed deﬁnitions of the Charmides as
forming necessary aspects or conditions of sophrosyne as deﬁned in the Republic. ἡσυχιότης as
a condition of the ἐπιθυμητικόν stops it from bothering the rest of the soulmore than necessary.
ἡμερότης in the θυμοειδές, where αἰδώς plays an important part (so our argument goes), is the
cultivated condition whichmakes it ready to accept the superiority of the λογιστικόν inmatters
of knowledge and reason. e λογιστικόν having attained knowledge of the good, is not in the
well-ordered city (and therefore neither in the well-ordered soul) allowed to remain with the
forms, but is convinced to descend back down into the cave, and to contribute to the σύνδεσμος
τῆς πόλεως, the binding-together of the city. It is convinced by reasoning, as is proper to it: It
owes its condition to the city, and must descend to habituate its vision to the darkness below,
so that once it gets used to the darkness, it will see much better than the rest, knowing the
truth and thus recognising the images; thus the city which maintains its being will itself be best
maintained, and will be most exempt from internal strife.¹⁷⁶ In relation to the soul, the same
will hold good: If the intellect were unwilling to apply its knowledge to guide the rest of the
soul, these would not be governed well, would not attend to their proper objects of desire in the
proper way and amount, and would, presumably, meddle in each other’s aﬀairs. e relation
between the parts of the soul resembles that of a family, and the φιλία, ἁρμονία and ὁμόνοια that
can come to ﬂorish between them is the φιλία between true οἰκεῖοι, family members, working
for the good for all.
¹⁷⁶ R. 520a6–d4.
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